God, faith and reason in the Philosophy of Nicholas Wolterstorff by Alivio-Bantiles, R. (Russell)
universidad de navarra 
Facultad Eclesiástica de Filosofía
Russell Alivio BAntiles
God, faith and reason in the Philosophy 
of nicholas Wolterstorff
Extracto de la Tesis Doctoral presentada en la 
Facultad Eclesiástica de Filosofía de la Universidad de Navarra
Pamplona 
2013
ad normam statutorum Facultatis Philosophiae universitatis navarrensis, 
perlegimus et adprobavimus
Pampilonae, die 10 mensis decembris anni 2012
Dr. Henricus Moros Dr. Franciscus GAllArdo
Coram tribunali, die 30 mensis maii anni 2012, hanc 
dissertationem ad Lauream Candidatus palam defendit
Secretarius Facultatis
Sr. D. Eduardus FlAndes
cuadernos doctorales de la Facultad eclesiástica de Filosofía
vol. 23, n. 1
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiÁSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 23 / 2013 / 5-123 7
iSSN: 1131-6950
introduction
EXCERPTA E DiSSERTATioNiBUS iN PHiLoSoPHiA
Abstract: inquiring About a Simple God  explores the 
philosophical position of nicholas Wolterstorff on the 
divine simplicity doctrine. a central tenet in Western 
theism, this doctrine faces serious objections owing 
to its alleged intrinsic and systematic incoherence. 
appealing to the constituent-relational ontology dis-
tinction, Wolterstorff explains the contemporary ba-
fflement over the doctrine. in this paper, i shall argue 
that, on relational ontology, reason is being restricted 
in its natural capacity to know the objective truth of 
reality. For this reason, the rejection on divine simpli-
city as incoherent from the perspective of relational 
ontology is quite premature and unwarranted.
Key words: divine simplicity, relational ontology, 
constituent ontology.
Resumen: inquiring About a Simple God examina la 
postura de nicholas Wolterstorff sobre la doctrina 
de la simplicidad divina. esta doctrina, que es central 
en teísmo, sufre graves objeciones con respecto a su 
coherencia intrínseca y sistemática. acudiendo a la 
distinción entre ontología constituyente y relacional, 
Wolterstorff arroja luz sobre la dificultad de la filosofía 
analítica contemporánea en aceptarla. sostengo, en 
cambio que, con la ontología relacional, la razón que-
da restringida en su capacidad de conocer la verdad 
objetiva. Por tanto, el rechazo de la simplicidad divina 
desde la perspectiva de la ontología relacional parece 
precipitado y carece de fundamento.
Palabras claves: simplicidad divina, ontología relacio-
nal, ontología constituyente.
The most obvious application of the persistent philosophical and theologi-
cal problem on the relationship between faith and reason concerns issues 
about God. And the topmost question in contemporary discussions focuses 
on the doctrine of divine simplicity. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s contribution to 
this debate consists mainly in explaining why the simplicity doctrine seems 
non-problematic to the medieval thinkers while it causes bafflement to the 
contemporary analytic philosophers. The distinction he makes between con-
stituent and relational ontological styles may have shed light on this enigma. 
Yet, it does not resolve the issue. Nevertheless, it allows us to see some pos-
sible way out.
in this investigation, i wish to explore Wolterstorff’s philosophical posi-
tion on the classical divine simplicity doctrine. While i adhere to his diagnosis 
that the contemporary bafflement over the said doctrine is attributable to the 
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relational ontological approach that characterizes the contemporary analytic 
philosophy, i question the tenability of this approach. After a rigorous analy-
sis, i hold that on relation ontology, reason is being restricted in its natural 
capacity to know the objective truth of reality. The most that this ontological 
approach could grasp is the veridical truth or the truth of the proposition. on 
relation ontology, reason tends to reduce being into its predicative conceptu-
alization, thereby neglecting being qua being.
on the relational approach, divine simplicity necessarily appears intrin-
sically incoherent. Yet, the problem lies, not in the doctrine, but in the ap-
proach. Hence, this study suggests that, upon discovering the inadequacy of 
relational style in viewing reality, we must recuperate Thomas Aquinas’ real-
veridical distinction of being as a conditio sine qua non for a more profound 
understanding of the divine simplicity doctrine. Moreover, to demonstrate 
its intrinsic coherence, this doctrine must be understood in the light of the 
Thomistic classical notion of God as Pure Actuality and Subsistent Existence. 
only in this way will the objections on the doctrine’s systematic incoherence 
with other theistic claims be dissolved. once the intrinsic and rational coher-
ence of the simplicity doctrine is established, we can see how reason and faith 
interact like «two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation 
of truth» 1.
our examination on Wolterstorff’s inquiry about a simple God naturally 
leads us to an engagement with his positions on various questions like di-
vine immutability, eternity and omniscience. As we shall see, besides arguing 
within a relational ontological style, our author’s arguments are based mainly 
on the data of faith as it is found in the Sacred Scriptures. Hence, part of this 
thesis’ aim is to affirm that reason, rightly understood and exercised, cannot 
be in conflict with faith and revelation. The inquiry on the doctrine on divine 
simplicity can attest to that. Thus, far from being irrelevant to the contem-
porary philosophical discussion on God especially in the analytic milieu, the 
simplicity doctrine must take its proper place at the heart of Western theism.
in my analysis and critique of Wolterstorff’s position, i am greatly 
endebted to the works of Peter Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity, Enrique Moros, 
El argumento ontológico modal de Alvin Plantinga and Modalidad y esencia, where 
 1 PoPe JoHn PAul ii, Encyclical Letter «Fides et Ratio» on the Relationship Between Faith and Reason, 
[September 14, 1998], in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 91 (1999), «introduction». (From here on, FR).
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this author makes a thorough analysis of relation ontology, Fernando inciarte, 
Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje: ensayos de metafísica, and Alejandro Llano, Metaphys-
ics and Language. i also owe a lot to the works of William vallicella, Eleonor 
Stump & Norman Kretzmann, Katherin Rogers, Brian Leftow and Gregory 
Ganssle.
As to the method, i follow a similar methodology used by our author. 
Calling it «Calvinist dialectic» of affirmation, negation and redemption, i at-
tempt to point out, first, the merits of Wolterstorff’s position. After specifying 
some of his objectionable points, i made an attempt to recuperate what could 
possibly be sustained. All of these in the spirit of the «dialogue of cultures» 
that Pope Benedict Xvi exhorts philosophers and theologians in Regensburg.
i wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the professors and staff of the 
Ecclesiastical Faculty of Philosophy and the Philosophy Department of the 
University of Navarra, especially to the Faculty Dean, Prof. Dr. José Ángel 
García Cuadrado, and to my thesis director, Prof. Dr. Enrique Moros, for 
his patient guidance and fraternal affection. To the members of the tribunal 
during the defense of this dissertation and to my colleagues in the «Taller de 
Filosofía», thank you and more power!
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inquiring about a simple God
«God is more truly thought
than He is spoken of and is
more truly than He is thought» 1
Saint Augustine of Hippo
i f God is absolutely simple, how can i pray to Him? The question seems naïve, but behind it is a whole gamut of philosophical and theological in-quiries about God and His relation to man and the world. At the heart of 
the classic Western theism lies the doctrine of divine simplicity, which holds 
that God is radically distinct from creatures in that neither metaphysical nor 
physical composition can be found in Him. viewed as the hallmark for divine 
transcendence 2, the doctrine reverberates in the discussions of other divine 
attributes (like immutability and eternity), as it confers God a unique onto-
logical status that affects greatly everything that is said of Him. But not a few 
contemporary thinkers find this status extremely peculiar, especially in its re-
lation to Christian faith.
in seeking a better understanding of his faith, Nicholas Wolterstorff 
finds it inevitable to inquire about a simple God. in this chapter, i shall 
attempt first to trace succinctly the origins and motivations of the simpli-
city doctrine and how its classic formulation fares in the hands of contem-
 1 AuGustine, The Trinity, 7, 4, 7. (Citations are from AuGustine, The Trinity, MckennA, s., 
c.ss.r. (trans.), The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1963).
 2 Peter Weigel notes that the doctrine is «indispensable to any credible notion of God’s absolute 
perfection and transcendence» (WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation into the Foun-
dation of His Philosophical Theology, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2008, p. 15).
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porary philosophers. Then, i shall analyze Wolterstorff’s diagnosis on the 
contemporary bafflement over this doctrine with his distinction between 
relational and constituent ontological approaches. Finally, after showing the 
inadequacy of relational ontology, i shall argue that our author’s rejection 
of the simplicity doctrine on the ground of its alleged incoherence based on 
this approach is quite premature and unwarranted. inquiring about a simple 
God requires the recovery of Thomas Aquinas’ notions of Pure Act and 
Subsistent Existence. This, in turn, calls for complementing relational with 
constituent ontology.
1. WHy divine siMPlicity?
A brief historical overview on the origins, formulations and motivations 
of the simplicity doctrine allows for a better contextualization of our discus-
sion.
1.1. Origins
The problem about a simple being is as old as the Western philosophical 
question on the one and the many. Thales, Parmenides and a host of Greek 
thinkers agree that there must be some fundamental unity that underlies the 
vast multiplicity of individual beings, their kinds and qualities. By Parmeni-
des’ time, the view that simplicity is a perfection that implies immutability 
and incorruptibility was already established. Plato, locating this unity in the 
World of Forms, posits the idea of the Supreme Good as constituting such 
unity and perfection – a doctrine that strongly influenced the Jewish and early 
Christian reflection on divine attributes. However, as the causal role of the 
Supreme Good remains vague, Aristotle suggests the idea of a Supreme Being, 
the First Mover and Efficient Cause of all beings, which is simple, subsisting, 
and immutable. Yet, Aristotle’s Supreme Being remains only as a cosmic mo-
ver rather than a creator ex nihilo, and is still considered ontologically finite by 
theistic standards.
At the close of the ancient world, the Greek idea of a simple first prin-
ciple was already prominent within the revival of classical Hellenistic philo-
sophy. The Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria holds that the notion of 
God as Being itself, utterly simple, devoid of composition and eternal was a 
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common tenet. He identifies the philosopher’s simple first being with the He-
brew Scripture’s personal God who consciously creates things modeled after 
the divine ideas 3.
However, the simplicity principle found its fullest expression in Plotinus and 
the Neo-Platonists 4. in his Enneads, Plotinus speaks of the simple first prin-
ciple as «the one», the least inadequate name for the source of all, which 
is unknowable, inexpressible, uncaused, self-explanatory and transcends all 
categories applicable to other things 5.
Even in calling it The First we mean no more than to express that it is the 
most absolutely simplex: it is Self-Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of 
that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent; 
it is the Self-Contained because everything contained in something alien must 
also exist by that alien 6.
Christian theological speculation in the Fathers of the Church and es-
pecially in the Middle Ages has given the simplicity doctrine extraordinary 
prominence 7 because, as Wolterstorff notes, the doctrine’s theoretical fecun-
dity provides extraordinary framework significance. «if one grants God’s sim-
plicity, then one also has to grant a large number of other divine attributes: 
immateriality, eternity, immutability, having no unrealized potentialities, etc., 
one’s interpretation of all God’s other attributes will have to be formed in the 
light of that conviction» 8. However, in the contemporary discussion especially 
among analytic philosophers, the question arises on whether both critics and 
defenders work with the traditional formula set forth by the late classical and 
medieval theologians like Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas.
 3 Cfr. WeiGel, P., «Divine Simplicity», in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 29, 2010, 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/div-simp/#H1> [Last consulted: September 12, 2011], p. 2.
 4 Cfr. roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», in Religious Studies, 32/2 
(1996), p. 165. 
 5 Cfr. Plotinus, Enneads, v, 3, 13; vi, 9, 3. (For this work i am using corriGAn, k., Reading 
Plotinus: a Practical Introduction to Neo-Platonism [Recurso electrónico], Purdue University Press, 
West Lafayette, ind., 2005).
 6 Plotinus, Enneads, ii, 9, 1. 
 7 «Divine simplicity lies at the heart of the classic Western philosophical concept of God» (Wei-
Gel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., p. 13).
 8 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», in WolterstorFF, n., Inquiring About God, p. 91.
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1.2. Classical Formulations
Wolterstorff and most contemporary analytic philosophers agree that 
Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas epitomize the classical formulation of the sim-
plicity doctrine 9. The latter’s version, however, is distinguished «to represent 
the historical peak of the doctrine’s articulation and defense» 10 and is usually 
referred to in contemporary discussions as the standard. in fact, Wolterstorff’s 
critical engagement with this doctrine focuses on its classical Thomistic for-
mulation, which, he claims, together with «most other classic formulations, 
fails to meet the requirement that it be compatible with what Christian Scrip-
ture claims and presupposes about God» 11. Specifically, he focuses on what he 
calls the three theistic identity claims: (a) God is identical with His essence; (b) 
God’s essence is identical with His existence; and (c) God’s essence is identical 
with His attributes 12.
However, i think Rogers rightly argues that in the contemporary dis-
cussions, «the traditional position has frequently been misrepresented. Thus, 
recent criticisms, even if they are cogent, succeed only against the doctrine of 
simplicity in its current form. And if the recent defenses seem tortuous and 
inadequate this need not cast doubt upon the defensibility of the traditional 
position» 13. Curiously enough, Wolterstorff himself holds that the theistic 
identity claims «emerged from the attempt of the medieval philosophers to 
articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity. They are not to be identified with 
the doctrine itself» 14.
in his book, The City of God, Augustine affirms that God’s nature is simple 
because «it is what it has» 15. We may take this to mean primarily that God 
 9 But Katherin Rogers warns of a «decided differences in the metaphysics of these three think-
ers, and the differences are felt in their discussions of this crucial question of divine simplicity» 
(roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 170).
10 Cfr. BroWer, J. e., «Making Sense of Divine Simplicity», in Faith and Philosophy, 25/1 (January, 
2008), p. 3. 
11 WolterstorFF, n., «introduction», in WolterstorFF, n., Inquiring About God, p. 12.
12 At the outset, let it be noted that Wolterstorff seems to take the simplicity doctrine in its positive 
sense. But as we shall see shortly, the doctrine is apophatic in its original conception. 
13 roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 165.
14 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 108.
15 «our reason for calling it simple is because it is what it has – with the exception of the real rela-
tions in which the Persons stand to each other» (AuGustine, The City of God, Xi, 10, WAlsH, G. 
G. and MonAHAn, G. (trans.), The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 
1963, p. 202).
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is His attributes and that there is no ontological distinction between them. 
Hence, whenever we say that God has any of His essential qualities, we take 
it strictly to mean that God is whatever quality we say of Him. in The Trinity, 
Augustine affirms:
We indeed use many different words concerning God, in order to bring 
out that He is great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else He may 
be called that is not unworthy of Him. But His greatness is the same as His 
wisdom... His goodness is the same as His wisdom and greatness; and His 
truth is the same as all these qualities. And in Him it is not one thing to be 
blessed, and another thing to be great, or to be wise, or to be true, or to be 
good, or in a word to be Himself 16.
Anselm argues in the same vein when he writes,
A human being cannot be justice, but he can have justice. Consequently, a 
just human being is not understood as existent justice (existens iustitia), but 
rather as having justice. Now the supreme nature cannot properly be said 
to have justice, but rather to exist as justice. Therefore, when He is said to 
be just, He is properly understood as existent justice, not as having justice 17.
What Augustine and Anselm make clear in these passages is that divine 
nature does not possess essential attributes but it is these attributes. otherwise, 
(a) God would not be what He is per se but per aliud, which is against the doc-
trine of divine aseity; and (b) God’s essential attributes would be what they 
are independently of God’s activity, which is against the doctrine of divine 
sovereignty 18.
16 AuGustine, The Trinity, vi, 7, 8.
17 AnselM, Monologion, Xvi. (i am using AnselM, Monologion and Proslogion with the Replies of 
Gaunilo and Anselm, WilliAMs, t. (trans. with introduction and Notes), Hackett Publishing 
Company, inc., indianapolis, 1995).
18 Alvin Plantinga holds that the «fundamental reason (for the simplicity doctrine) is to accommo-
date God’s aseity and sovereignty» (PlAntinGA, A., Does God Have a Nature?, Marquette Uni-
versity Press, Milwaukee, 1980, p. 28). But Plantinga argues that «God has a nature which is not 
identical with Him» (p. 10). if this is true, then, we are faced with the problem which Rogelio 
Rovira has clearly pointed out: «¿Cuál es el estatuto ontológico de las verdades eternas y en qué 
consiste la diversa y peculiar relación que guardan estas verdades con el ser infinito de Dios y 
con el entendimiento finito del hombre?» (rovirA, r., «¿Puede hacer Dios lo imposible?: sobre 
la concepción cartesiana de la omnipotencia divina», in Revista de Filosofía, 3ª época, 6/10 (1993), 
p. 349). 
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in Aquinas’ version, simplicity is taken as a negative concept – it means 
the absence or negation of any composition. in treating the divine simplicity 
in eight articles in his Summa Theologiae 19, Aquinas proceeds by examining all 
possible compositions that are found in creatures to see if any of them takes 
place in God. After proving that none is found compatible with the divine 
nature, he concludes that God is absolutely simple. Weigel succinctly obser-
ves that Aquinas’ presentation «effects an increasing precision and cumulative 
enrichment of the concept of simplicity... The Summa Theologiae begins with 
simplicity in the material order and then proceeds by way of the logical or-
der to the ontological one» 20. Aquinas’ arguments could be summarized as 
follows 21:
a) God is not composed of any extended parts: God is not a body.
b) God is not composed of matter and form: God is a spirit.
c) God is not composed of substance and accidents: God is a substance 
without accidents.
d) God is not composed of essence and being: God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens.
e) God is not composed of subject and nature: hence, God is absolutely 
simple.
in order to negate whatever composition in God, Aquinas proposes a 
series of arguments 22: (a) All composite entails act-potency distinction. But 
God is simply Pure Act; (b) Every composition is posterior to its components, 
and is dependent on them. But God is the First Being; (c) All composite has 
a cause. But God is the First Uncaused Cause. if, in God there is no com-
position whatsoever, then, God must be absolutely simple. Thus, to engage 
with the Aquinas’ version and to have a better grasp of it, one has to examine 
thoroughly these three fundamental Thomistic tenets: Act and Potency, Ipsum 
Esse Subsistens, First Uncaused Cause 23. Their profound understanding helps 
19 tHoMAs AquinAs, Summa Theologiae, i, q. 3. (i am using tHoMAs AquinAs, Summa Theologiae, 
2nd and revised ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.), kniGHt, k. [Electronic 
on-line Edition], New Advent, 2009). (From here on, S. Th.).
20 WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., p. 24. 
21 For a more concise and substantial presentation of Aquinas’ simplicity doctrine, see González, 
A. l., Teología natural, 6ª ed., EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, pp. 157-164).
22 S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 7.
23 on these points, Weigel observes that «contemporary philosophers of religion often do not 
understand his (Aquinas’) position or delve very deeply into it» (WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplic-
ity..., p. 13). 
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one to see how, contra Wolterstorff, the simplicity doctrine can be logically 
sustained 24.
But the apophatic character of the concept of simplicity does not mean 
that nothing can be known of God 25. Patrick Madigan accurately notes that, 
with Aquinas’ version of simplicity doctrine, traditional theism is saved from 
falling into apophatic or purely negative theology without compromising di-
vine transcendence. At the same time, it has avoided pluralism in the predi-
cation of divine attributes – a pluralism that, i think, borders on some form 
of anthropomorphism. Madigan notes that two doctrines allow Aquinas to 
achieve this: (a) the identity claims with the doctrine on Pure Act; (b) the 
principle of effects resembling their cause 26.
1.3. Motivations and Reasons
Traditional theism often characterizes God’s absolute independence in 
terms of aseity 27. The Anselmian notion of God as maximally perfect – as that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived – and Aquinas’ Five Ways to de-
monstrate that God exists as the Uncaused First Cause 28 necessarily entail that 
God must be absolutely independent 29. Now, an absolutely independent being 
24 González argues that to show that God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens is the ultimate proof for divine 
simplicity. «Bastaría, pues, probar que en Dios no existe este tipo de composición para que dejen 
de tener sentido, aplicables a Él, las demás composiciones... La composición y la distinción real 
de esencia y acto de ser es (...) la estructura fundamental que todo ente creado tiene. En conse-
cuencia, si se demuestra que a Dios no le compete tampoco este tipo de composición, puede uno 
comprender mejor que tampoco se dan las demás estructuras y podrá, en cierto modo, atisbar 
algo de lo que es la simplicidad divina» (González, A. l., Teología natural, pp. 160-161). 
25 «La simplicidad divina no es ausencia de contenido, sino por el contrario infinita riqueza, ple-
nitud de realidad poseída en perfecta unidad. La ausencia de toda composición no señala algún 
tipo de no ser, no implica defecto de cualquier tipo en Dios, sino precisamente al revés. La 
suprema simplicidad de Dios es, al mismo tiempo, el Todo separado, infinitamente perfecto» 
(González, A. l., Teología natural, p. 164).
26 Cfr. MAdiGAn, P., «Review on WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation into the Foun-
dations of his Philosophical Theology», in The Heythrop Journal, 50/4 (July 2009), p. 724.
27 Cfr. BroWer, J. e., «Simplicity and Aseity», in Flint, t. P. and reA, M. c. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophical Theology, oxford University Press, oxford, 2008, p. 4. 
28 S. Th. i, q. 2, a. 3. The notion of God as the Uncaused Cause requires clarification. Ángel 
Luis González makes clear that no being could be its own cause because nothing can be in act 
and in potency in the same respect. For a more detailed analysis of Aquinas’ Second Way, see 
González, A. l., Teología natural, pp. 106-109.
29 Cfr. S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 7. This is especially true when the Five Ways are considered as a whole and 
viewed from a unified perspective.
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exists entirely by itself (a se). And a self-subsisting being must be absolutely 
simple. Divine aseity, then, is the chief motivation for divine simplicity.
However, Brower notes that even traditional theists are in disagreement 
as to whether or not divine aseity is essential to God’s nature. 30 Those who 
follow the Aristotelian thought, like Aquinas, consider divine aseity as the 
most fundamental feature of our notion of God. Meanwhile, others who ar-
gue along neo-Platonic veins take divine perfection as the most basic. Divine 
aseity, for them, simply follows directly from divine goodness. it is argued that 
dependence on another is an imperfection. if God is absolutely perfect, He 
must exist a se.
Classic theism also views the simplicity doctrine as a guarantee to divine 
transcendence. Since God is identical with Himself and His attributes, He is 
radically different from the rest of beings 31. vallicella says that the doctrine 
«is to be understood as an affirmation of God’s absolute transcendence of 
creatures. God is not only radically non-anthropomorphic, but radically non-
creaturomorphic, not only in respect of the properties he possesses, but in his 
manner of possessing them. God, we could say, differs in His very ontology 
from any and all created beings» 32. Weigel notes that for Aquinas, «simplicity 
is indispensable for upholding God’s transcendence. its claims constitute God 
being infinitely separate from every other entity and so too from any compe-
ting notion of a divinity or first principle» 33.
Adherents to divine simplicity often highlight two reasons for adopting 
the doctrine. Eleonor Stump and Norman Kreztmann argue that the doctrine 
enables us to solve the Euthyphro paradox concerning God’s relationship to 
morality. God neither invents nor obeys the moral law. He is the standard of 
goodness since He is Perfect Goodness itself 34. Besides, the doctrine supports 
30 Cfr. BroWer, J. e., «Simplicity and Aseity», pp. 4-5.
31 David B. Burrell holds that divine simplicity distinguishes God from the world and is «part of 
what assures us we are talking about divinity» (Burrell, d., «Distinguishing God from the 
World», in dAvies, B., oP (ed.), Language, Meaning and God: Essays in Honour of Herbert McCabe, 
OP, Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1987, p. 77).
32 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity», in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 2, 2010, <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/divine-simplicity> [Last consulted: November 22, 
2011], p. 1. Thus, on this perspective, to view God’s having properties in the same way we view 
creatures having properties is, to me, a crass error. 
33 WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., p. 13.
34 Cfr. stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Absolute Simplicity», in Faith and Philosophy, 2/4 (october, 
1985), pp. 376-378; cfr. also roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 167.
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the cosmological argument 35 and, as Brian Leftow maintains, offers a variant 
of the ontological argument 36.
Wolterstorff, in criticizing divine simplicity, immutability, eternity and 
impassibility, tries to show that Aquinas’ argument for divine aseity is mis-
taken. «i do not believe that God is simple, ontologically immutable, eternal 
in the sense of being outside of time, or impassible... if simplicity, eternity, 
ontological immutability, and impassibility all have to go, then aseity also has 
to go» 37. But something in Wolterstorff’s interpretation of Aquinas’ view on 
divine aseity makes one think that a misinterpretation occurs, making such 
rejection unwarranted. Wolterstorff says, for instance, that
if God uniquely possessed aseity, then not only the existence but also the 
properties of everything other than God would be dependent on God, 
while the existence and properties of God would not be dependent on 
anything other than God... My disagreement is with the claim that God’s 
having the properties God does have is never dependent on anything other 
than God 38.
For Wolterstorff, God’s having properties depends also on creatures (like 
God’s being wronged by us). But on the aseity doctrine, God’s having properties 
cannot depend either on God or on anything other than God simply because, 
strictly speaking, God does not have properties, or, at least, not in the way crea-
tures have them. instead, God is His properties. As vallicella rightly points 
out, «the divine aseity would seem to require that God be rather have his 
35 Stump and Kretzmann argue that the doctrine «can supply... the explanation of the necessity of 
God’s existence. The answer to the question ‘Why does God exist?’ is that He cannot not exist... 
because He is absolutely simple, He is identical with His nature... The necessity of God’s exis-
tence is not one more characteristic of God which needs an explanation of its own but is instead 
a logical consequence of God’s absolute simplicity» (stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Absolute 
Simplicity», p. 377).
36 Leftow holds: «Regardless of what attributes a God identical with His nature will have and of 
whether one opts for full divine simplicity, the identity Thesis yields a way to argue for God’s 
existence» (leFtoW, B., «is God an Abstract object?» in Noûs, 24/4 (September, 1990), p. 595). 
37 WolterstorFF, n., «introduction», pp. 12, 15.
38 For example, «that being wronged by us is one of the things that characterize God. God has this 
property on account of our having wronged God; had we not wronged God, God would not 
have this property. Thus God’s having that property is dependent on us» (WolterstorFF, n., 
«introduction», p. 15).
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attributes» 39. Thus, seen from this perspective, Wolterstorff’s disagreement 
becomes null and void because the question on dependence loses its sense.
However, deeper analysis would reveal that latent in Wolterstorff’s ob-
jection is the assumption that divine aseity or simplicity is incompatible with 
God’s relationship with the world. God’s being wronged by us presupposes 
such relationship. But if God is absolutely simple, how can He relate or act 
in the world? in his study on how Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa 
have transformed the question on divine simplicity, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz 
argues that it is precisely God’s relationship with the world which the simpli-
city doctrine upholds. «one must continually seek for ways to show what it 
means that ‘God’ and ‘world’ are not opposites... Divine simplicity tells us that 
God is distinct from the world, not that God is opposed to it in such a way that 
God cannot by definition act in the world. Divine simplicity will always sanc-
tion contradiction. But divine activity in the world is not a contradiction in 
terms» 40. The said assumption pervades the contemporary objections against 
divine simplicity.
2. conteMPorAry deBAte
Wolterstorff observes that contemporary theologians seldom deal with 
the simplicity doctrine in their reflections about God 41. As Brower concurs, 
«Philosophers and theologians now seldom speak of divine simplicity, and 
when they do, their remarks are almost always critical. indeed, contempo-
rary analytic theists often take themselves to have conclusive reasons for re-
jecting it» 42. Brower has in mind C. B. Martin who says, «The trouble with 
the idea is just that it is hogwash» 43. Quentin Smith declares, not without 
39 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity», p. 3.
40 rAdde-GAllWitz, A., Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Sim-
plicity, oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 232. 
41 «And when they do, they rarely (if ever) give it a significant structural role in their doctrine of 
God – let alone give it the pre-eminent role that it enjoyed in the articulated doctrine of God 
developed by the medieval school theologians» (WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», pp. 
91-92). 
42 BroWer, J. e., «Simplicity and Aseity», p. 1. 
43 MArtin, c.B., «God, the Null Set and Divine Simplicity», in kinG-FArloW, J. (ed.), The Chal-
lenge to Religion Today, New York: Science History, 1976, p. 40, cited by BroWer, J. e., «Simplic-
ity and Aseity», pp. 1-2.
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bias, that divine simplicity is not only «plainly self-contradictory, and its 
hold on some people’s minds testifies to the predominance of faith over in-
tellectual coherence» 44.
Weigel classifies the objections against the simplicity doctrine into three 
categories: one intrinsic and two systematic 45. As to the intrinsic type, some 
contemporary theists reject the doctrine on the grounds that identifying 
God with pure actuality and pure subsistent existence is «ill-founded or even 
incoherent» 46. The first type of systematic objection holds that simplicity is 
incompatible with the multiple predicates attributed to God. Wolterstorff is 
inscribed to the second type, which holds that simplicity doctrine is inconsis-
tent with particular divine attributes predicated of God in Sacred Scriptures 
and religious worship. our author himself observes that an immutable, un-
changing and simple divinity is incompatible with the knowing, loving and 
redeeming biblical God.
Weigel, however, observes that the intensely systematic focus of the con-
temporary debates is mainly due to the critics’ assumption that the doctrine is 
a prominent barrier to any intuitively sensible concept of God that must be re-
moved 47. in discussing these contemporary objections and in presenting their 
possible responses, i wish to point out how the Angelic Doctor could engage 
with some of our contemporaries and, in so doing, highlight his relevance to 
contemporary philosophy.
44 sMitH, q., «An Analysis of Holiness», in Religious Studies, 24 (1988), p. 524, note no. 3.
45 Cfr. WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., pp. 16-19. Radde-Gallwitz calls the two systematic ob-
jections the identity thesis and radical apophaticism. God’s identity with His attributes is incompat-
ible with the belief on «particular providence» and «prevenient grace». Divine simplicity entails 
that God is beyond His attributes, which is incompatible with the positive divine titles that the 
Bible attribute to God. Basil and Gregory’s concept of propria, says Radde-Gallwitz, helps in 
confronting these objections (cfr. rAdde-GAllWitz, A., Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa..., pp. 
10-11). See discussion on Multiple Predicates.
46 Weigel cites Anthony Kenny, who takes this as his central thesis in criticizing Aquinas (cfr. 
kenny, A., Aquinas on Being, oxford University Press, oxford, 2002), Christopher Hughes, 
who is skeptical that this position makes sense (cfr. HuGHes, c., On a Complex Theory of a Simple 
God, Cornell University Press, ithaca, New York, 1989), and C.J. F. Williams, whose analysis 
is a fair representative of the modern view (cfr. WilliAMs, c. J. F., «Being», in quinn, P. and 
tAliAFerro, c. (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, oxford University Press, ox-
ford, 1997, pp. 223-228). 
47 Weigel also notes that most of the contemporary discussion citing Aquinas’ notion of divine 
simplicity is centered only on the question of the doctrine’s systematic coherence with other 
predicates and that studies on its intrinsic character are few, and at most, lacking in philosophical 
depth (cfr. WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., pp. 15-16).
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2.1. Question on Coherence
As vallicella accurately clarifies, the question on coherence refers not 
so much on whether the simplicity doctrine is true or possibly true, but on 
«whether it is possible for us to think (of) it without obvious contradiction» 48, 
that is, whether there is any ontological framework within which the divi-
ne simplicity doctrine is coherently defensible. This is important because it 
allows us to see that even if most contemporary thinkers could present co-
gent arguments proving the doctrine’s incoherence, its utter rejection on this 
ground is not decisive, for in fact, as Wolterstorff himself holds, it could be 
proven coherent on some other ontological framework.
Wolterstorff refers to Alvin Plantinga’s book, Does God Have a Natu-
re?, for a lucid presentation of the difficulties involving the theistic identity 
claims 49. Plantinga writes,
There are two difficulties, one substantial and the other truly monumental. 
in the first place if God is identical with each of his properties, then each of 
his properties is identical with each of his properties, so that God has but 
one property. This seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God 
has several properties; he has both power and mercifulness, say, neither of 
which is identical with the other. in the second place, if God is identical 
with each of his properties, then, since each of his properties is a proper-
ty, he is a property – a self-exemplifying property. Accordingly, God has 
just one property: himself. This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious 
and overwhelming. No property could have created the world; no property 
could be omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all. if God is a property, 
then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, 
awareness, power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems an 
utter mistake» 50.
if God, being identical with His essence and having multiple properties, 
is identical with each of them, then, He is identical with one property and each 
of God’s properties is identical with one another. But both are absurd for God 
is a person, and is neither a property nor an abstract object. Besides, all divine 
48 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity», p. 4.
49 Brower considers it as «the locus classicus for contemporary difficulties with simplicity» (BroW-
er, J. e., «Simplicity and Aseity», p. 2).
50 PlAntinGA, A., Does God Have a Nature?, p. 47. 
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properties are distinct from each other. Rogers insists that the claim «God is 
identical with His properties, is not the one found in Augustine or Anselm 
or Aquinas. The traditional doctrine denies that God has any properties at 
all. God is... an eternal, immutable, absolutely simple act» 51. Even Plantinga 
already realizes that what he believes he has refuted might not be what the me-
dievals meant. What follows is a brief inquiry on how contemporary thinkers 
interpret the medievals’ understanding of properties, how multiple properties 
relate to each other and to God and how identifying God with His properties 
is coherent with the theistic claim that God is a person.
2.2. Interpreting Properties
Granting his notion of property, Plantinga insinuates that, since the iden-
tity claims are incoherent, something must be wrong with the simplicity doc-
trine. Some contemporary simplicity defenders think something may be wrong 
with Plantinga’s notion of property 52. Brower observes rightly that Plantinga 
has adopted a form of Platonic realism, which raises serious problems for the 
simplicity doctrine, the most serious of which is what vallicella calls «an onto-
logical category-mistake». vallicella’s observation is quite illuminating:
Plantinga, along with many other philosophers, thinks of individuals and pro-
perties as belonging to radically disjoint realms despite the fact that indivi-
duals exemplify properties. individuals are causally efficacious concreta whe-
reas properties are casually impotent abstracta. Such an approach to ontology 
renders the divine simplicity inconceivable from the outset. For if God is a 
concrete individual and his nature (conceived perhaps as the conjunction of 
his omni-attributes) is an abstract property, then the general ontology rules 
out an identity of God with his nature. Any such identity would violate the se-
parateness of the two realms. To identify an unexemplifiable concretum with an 
exemplifiable abstractum would amount to an ontological category-mistake 53.
51 roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 166.
52 Brower notes that «most philosophers writing about simplicity since Plantinga have assumed 
that the apparent absurdity of the doctrine derives entirely from the specific conception of prop-
erties in terms of which Plantinga interprets it» (BroWer, J., «Making Sense...», p. 9). Enrique 
Moros analyses thoroughly Plantinga’s concept of property and points out some problems it 
entails (cfr. Moros, e., Modalidad y esencia: la metafísica de Alvin Plantinga, EUNSA, Pamplona, 
1996, pp. 233-256).
53 vAllicellA, W. F., «Divine Simplicity», pp. 4-5.
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To avoid Plantinga’s interpretation, some contemporary thinkers venture 
into adopting other notions of property 54. William Mann holds that proper-
ties are not some Platonic abstract universals but concrete individuals or «pro-
perty instances» of these universals 55. Hence, Aquinas should be interpreted as 
saying that God is identical with His «property instances». «What Aquinas’ 
version of DDS (doctrine on divine simplicity) claims is that the property ins-
tance of God’s being wise is identical to the property instance of God’s being 
powerful, etc.» 56. With this, Mann hopes to avoid the absurdity of thinking 
that abstract entities like Wisdom and Goodness are identical with each other 
and that God is an abstract object.
in trying to confront the principle «No property instance is a person», 
latent in the objection «if God is a property-instance, He is not a person», 
Mann assumes that every person is a property instance since everything is 
an instantiation of its appropriate rich property. Wolterstorff criticizes him 
for confusing property instantiation with property exemplification. «Whereas 
Socrates exemplified the property, wisdom, Socrates’ wisdom instantiated it...
What reason is there to think that Socrates’ instantiation of his rich proper-
ty just is Socrates?» 57. But Mann falls into a more serious setback: if God is 
identical with His property instance, then, He will lack aseity, since, as Brower 
notes, property instances depend for their existence on universal properties 
that exist apart from God 58. Thomas v. Morris rightly notes that if God is a 
54 Brower rules out adopting a form of Aristotelian realism that takes properties as concrete uni-
versals for it is as problematic as the Platonic realism. Since universals are multiply exemplifiable 
entities, to interpret simplicity in terms of concrete universals would entail that God is both 
multiply exemplifiable and capable of serving as a constituent of other concrete particulars, 
which is absurd (cfr. BroWer, J., «Making Sense...», p. 9). 
55 Cfr. MAnn, W., «Divine Simplicity», in Religious Studies, 18 (1982), p. 457. Wolterstorff iden-
tifies property instances with his cases, with D. C. William’s abstract particulars and tropes, with 
Aristotle’s entities present in something¸ and «at least some of them are what the medievals called 
qualia» (WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 96). 
56 MAnn, W., «Divine Simplicity», p. 457. in the rest of his article, Mann argues that property 
instances in God are identical with each other.
57 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 97. But had Mann maintained such distinction by 
holding that while Socrates’ wisdom instantiates the property «wisdom», Socrates (individual, 
person) exemplifies the property-instance (or rich property), it could have been a coherent theory 
and could have presented the considerable advantage which Moros points out: «las instancias 
sólo existen si existe el sujeto que las ejemplifica» (Moros, e., El argumento ontológico modal de 
Alvin Plantinga, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1997, p. 142).
58 Cfr. BroWer, J. e., «Making Sense...», p. 11.
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property instance, «the clearly unacceptable consequence will follow that God 
is a feature of something ontologically more fundamental than himself» 59. 
Mann replies Morris’ objection by identifying God’s property with His instan-
ce of that property. omniscience must be identical with God’s omniscience 60. 
However, criticizing against its ad hoc character, Wolterstorff rejects Mann’s 
solution because it has not done away with Plantinga’s objection: «if God is 
identical with the property instance, God’s omniscience, and if that property ins-
tance is identical with the property, being omniscient, then it follows that God 
is a property» 61. Mann’s solution fails 62.
Another interpretation of property is to take it as a self-exemplifying 
substance. vallicella grants that if properties are exemplifiable and substan-
ces are not except by themselves, then, those self-exemplifying substances 
qualify as properties. He argues that God is identified with His properties, 
construed as self-exemplifying entities 63. Leftow argues in similar vein that 
the identity claim «God=nature» does not only mean that what we pre-
viously thought to be two (substance and property) are now one single enti-
ty, which has all the characteristics properly belonging to each of them. But 
it may also entail that these characteristics constitute only a proper subset 
of those originally associated with God and His nature. Thus, we may hold 
that some properties are concrete particular substances capable of exempli-
fication 64. But Brower criticizes the ad hoc character of these strategies. He 
notes that behind them is the attempt «to uphold a version of the property 
interpretation», something that, he suggests, we must abandon if we want to 
make sense of the simplicity doctrine 65. Besides, Wolterstorff flatly rejects 
that properties are self-exemplifying. «We hold that, in general, properties 
59 Morris, t. v., «on God and Mann», in Religious Studies, 21 (1985), p. 303. 
60 Cfr. MAnn, W. e., «Simplicity and Properties: A Reply to Morris», in Religious Studies, 22 
(1986), p. 352.
61 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 99.
62 vallicella also shows how Mann’s solution is not viable (cfr. vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplic-
ity: A New Defense» in Faith and Philosophy, 9 (1992), pp. 510-512).
63 «Are there, then, any properties identical with individuals? Yes, every property whose self-ex-
emplification entails its identity with an individual. Among these, i shall argue, are the divine 
attributes» (vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 514).
64 Cfr. leFtoW, B., «is God an Abstract object?», pp. 593-594. Leftow responds to Plantinga’s 
objection saying, «Even if the identity Thesis is true, it does not follow that God is any sort of 
abstract object» (p. 593).
65 Cfr. BroWer, J. e., «Making Sense...», p. 16.
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are not self-exemplifying... that knowledge does not know, that love does 
not love...» 66. To adopt this solution, then, is to engage in a seemingly unen-
ding debate on this question 67.
one possible alternative is to view properties in terms of what are now 
known as ‘tropes’. vallicella thinks it will work for tropes are ontologically 
simple entities. Between God and tropes we can find a number of things in 
common: (a) there is no distinction between the entity and its properties; (b) 
both are not particulars that exemplify universals; (c) in both, we have a parti-
cular that is also a property; (d) we have a subject of predication that is also a 
predicable entity, where the predicable entity is predicated of itself. The only 
difference is that «whereas God is unique, tropes are not: there is and can be 
only one God, but there are many redness tropes» 68.
on trope theory, properties are assayed not as universals but as particulars: 
the redness of a tomato is as particular, as unrepeatable, as the tomato... A 
trope is a simple entity in that there is no distinction between it and the 
property it ‘has.’ Thus a redness trope is red, but it is not red by instantia-
ting redness, or by having redness as a constituent, but by being (a bit of) 
redness. So a trope is what it has. it has redness by being identical to (a bit 
of) redness. in this respect it is like God who is what he has 69.
But Brower doubts the trope theory will work in defending the simplicity 
doctrine. He argues that, although identifying God with a trope may avoid 
making Him dependent on a universal (since the theory denies that universals 
exist), it could not guarantee divine aseity because tropes, by nature, depend 
on the subjects to which they belong (and which are distinct from themselves) 
for their existence. However, contemporary debates on tropes are focused on 
the question of its essence and existence. The merit of this theory resides in 
66 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 108. But if this is so, then, it reveals the limitation 
of abstract realities thus conceived, and uncovers a more difficult question on their nature. Love 
cannot love because it cannot exist apart from the being that loves: it has no being in itself. 
67 Smith, for instance, cites «existence» as a self-exemplifying property: «the property of existence 
is to say that this property is self-exemplifying» (sMitH, q., «An Analysis of Holiness», p. 521). 
if so, then, existence is a first-order and a second-order property, as Smith holds. Curiously, 
Smith cites Plantinga, David Kaplan, among others as holding this notion of existence, contrary 
to Wolterstorff’s claim.
68 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity», p. 18. 
69 Ibid., p. 17.
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redirecting our attention away from Plantinga’s property interpretation back 
to the simplicity doctrine’s central claim.
Plantinga’s objection has diverted our attention from the central notion 
of simplicity to his own concept of property 70. He misconstrues the doctrine 
by treating it as telling us something about God’s having properties when, in 
fact, having properties is what it precisely denies. «From first to last the doc-
trine of divine simplicity is a piece of negative or apophatic theology and not 
a purported description of God» 71. What Aquinas claims is not that God has 
properties which are identical with His nature, but that in God, there is no 
ontological composition of who He is and what He has 72. For this reason, that 
God is esse is not an identity statement similar to «Fido is a dog».
Therefore, that God is identical with His properties does not necessarily 
mean that God is a property (converting God into a property). To understand 
better the scope of this doctrine, we need to return to Aquinas’ notion of 
God as Pure Act. Rogers’ objection to Plantinga runs along this line 73. Acts 
are what one does; properties are what one possesses. Confusion may easily 
arise between the two, since, as Rogers explains, «For created beings, to do 
an action implies to have a property. That is, ‘Sophia writes’, implies ‘Sophia 
is literate’. Sophia could not write if she did not possess the power of being 
70 Citing ignacio Angelelli, Moros distinguishes the classical notion of property as accident from 
the contemporary concept as universal abstract entities. He points out that on the former, a 
property can be an individual with a concrete (real) being like any substance (cfr. Moros, e., 
Modalidad y esencia..., pp. 237-238) Angelelli says that a «far-reaching consequence of the 
‘ontological square’ is that the term ‘property’ becomes equivocal» (AnGelelli, i., Studies on 
Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, 
1967, p. 254). 
71 dAvies, B., oP, «Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», in dAvies, B., oP 
(ed.), Language, Meaning and God: Essays in Honour of Herbert McCabe, OP, Geoffrey Chapman, 
London, 1987, p. 59. Davies also notes that the simplicity doctrine is «an exercise in ‘logical 
grammar’; its aim is to tell us the sort of conclusions about God which are not to be drawn», 
namely, that He is composite». David Burrell, likewise, argues that the doctrine is «a way of 
remarking that no articulated form of expression can succeed in stating anything about God» 
(Burrell, d., Aquinas, God and Action, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p. 18). Cfr. also 
PiePer, J., The Silence of Saint Thomas, MurrAy, J. and o’connor, d. (trans.), St. Augustine’s 
Press, South Bend, ind., 1999).
72 Davies’ point is decisive: «to say that who God is cannot be something different from what God 
is» (dAvies, B., oP, «Classical Theism...», p. 62).
73 Plantinga’s criticism, she says, «entirely misses the mark when the traditional doctrine is in 
question» for «Not only does God do things, but He just is what He does» (roGers, k., «The 
Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 171).
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able to write. i take it that any creaturely action is the manifestation of some 
property, or, as Aquinas would put it, the actualization of some potential» 74. 
in view of this, i submit that Aquinas’ notion of Pure Act –not the concept of 
property– is what best illuminates the simplicity doctrine. Unless we abandon 
the property interpretation and adopt the Thomistic view, the doctrine will 
always present coherence problems, the most immediate of which is the pro-
blem on multiple predicates.
2.3. Multiple Predicates
if God is identical with each of His essential properties, then, each of 
God’s properties is identical with each other, so that God has but one pro-
perty. But obviously God has several properties. God’s omniscience and om-
nipotence are not identical with the other. How could we coherently apply 
multiple predicates to God?
Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa already have provided a substan-
tial solution to this question. They claim that certain class of divine attributes 
should be viewed as propria (a Latin translation of a set of Greek terms –like 
ΐδιος, ΐδιον, ή ίδιότης– that denote non-essential but necessary characteristic 
features of a species) 75. Radde-Gallwitz notes that this notion is a unique cons-
trual of the simplicity doctrine.
Propria necessarily inhere in the natures of which they are propria, and 
do so uniquely, such that they serve as identifying markers for those natu-
res. Accordingly, they make possible knowledge of those natures that is not 
merely relative or mind-dependent-that is not merely knowledge by epinoia 
(though we should not disparage this either). Yet, at the same time, propria do 
not define the essence. God’s propria of goodness, wisdom, power, justice, and 
truth do not tell us what it is to be God. God is simultaneously known and 
74 roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 172.
75 Non-essentially necessary features include, for instance, the risibility of humans. «it is propria of 
this sort that Basil and Gregory have in mind when they use the terminology to speak of God’s 
attributes. Just as we cannot think of a horse that cannot neigh, we cannot think of God without 
goodness. The ability to neigh is no part of the essence of a horse. Yet, it is a necessary truth that 
if something is a horse, it is able to neigh, and if something is able to neigh, it is a horse. Thus, 
there is a kind of non-essential necessity with properties of this sort, which distinguishes them 
from strictly accidental properties» (rAdde-GAllWitz, A., Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa..., 
p. xx).
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unknown, and part of the theological task is stating clearly where the lines are 
drawn between these 76.
The approach that Stump and Kreztmann decide on makes use of Gott-
lob Frege’s famous distinction between sense and reference 77. That God is ut-
terly simple does not preclude the conceptual distinction of His actions in the 
world from one another and from God Himself. Hence, what the simplicity 
doctrine entails is that we take all the names of God’s multiple predicates as 
«identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various ways to the 
one actual entity which is God himself or designating various manifestations 
of it» 78.
«Perfect power» and «perfect knowledge» are precise analogues for «the 
morning star» and «the evening star»: non-synonymous expressions de-
signating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same thing... «Per-
fect power is identical with perfect knowledge» does not entail that power 
is identical with knowledge any more than the fact that the summit of a 
mountain’s east slope is identical with the summit of its west slope entails 
the identity of the slopes 79.
vallicella has a point in criticizing this view as «confusing, employing as 
it does two distinct analogies that are dubious in themselves and not obviously 
compatible with each other» 80. indeed, comparing the multiple divine predi-
cates to Frege’s «modes of presentation» (Darstellungsweisen), like the analogy 
of «morning star» and the «evening star», entails a dilemma. The Fregean 
analogy, he wisely observes, «requires the distinctness of senses in order to 
account for the informativeness of the identity claim» 81. Thus, either these 
predicates are senses –in which case, they must be really distinct from each 
76 rAdde-GAllWitz, A., Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa..., p. 225. «Basil and Gregory’s account 
of this», says Radde-Gallwitz, «has what i take to be the virtue of simultaneously affirming the 
absolute reliability of human knowledge of God (since knowledge of propria is not ‘partial’ in the 
sense of knowing a ‘part’) and the necessary limitation of that knowledge (since knowing propria 
is different from knowing essential definitions)» (p. 17).
77 Cfr. FreGe, G., «on Sense and Reference», in Moore, A.W. (ed.), Meaning and Reference, ox-
ford University Press, oxford, 1993, pp. 23-42.
78 stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Absolute Simplicity», p. 356.
79 Ibid., p. 357.
80 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 509.
81 Ibid., p. 510. 
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other– or not. But if they are not senses, what makes them distinct so as to 
account for the identity claim?
Mann suggests that multiple properties confer causal powers on the en-
tities that exemplify them. He says, «P is a property of an object, x, only if P’s 
presence in x confers some causal power(s) on x. P and Q are the same pro-
perty if and only if (1) P and Q confer the same causal powers on their objects 
and (2) whatever is sufficient to bring about an instance of P in an object, x, is 
sufficient to bring about an instance of Q in x, and vice versa» 82. But obviously 
this proposal will not work, since, how can properties confer causal powers if 
they are abstract objects, hence, causally inert?
vallicella’s solution seems promising. After establishing –contra Plantin-
ga– that some self-exemplifying properties can be individuals 83, he suggests 
that divine attributes are properties «whose self-exemplification entails its 
identity with an individual» 84. To explain their mutual identity, vallicella 
shows that they are coextensive. He argues that: (a) «Each divine attribute, as 
both self-exemplifying and such that its possessor cannot be non-conscious, 
is identical with some individual or other; (b) Necessarily, the divine attribu-
tes are coextensive; (c) Therefore, there is exactly one individual with which 
each attribute is identical; therefore, by Transitivity of identity, (d) the at-
tributes are identical with each other» 85. Unlike Mann’s view, which claims 
that coextensive properties are necessarily identical, vallicella holds that the 
reason divine attributes are identical with each other is that «each divine attri-
bute is identical with an individual, and the individuals are identical with one 
another» 86. Lastly, since divine attributes are not multiply exemplifiable, as 
82 MAnn, W., «Simplicity and Properties», p. 352. 
83 Defining individual (i) as that which (a) exemplifies properties, (b) is not multiply exemplifi-
able, and (c) is not exemplified by anything distinct from itself, and property (P) as that which is 
exemplified, vallicella claims that these definitions allow «for some properties to be identical 
with individuals. For if property Q were exemplifiable only by itself it would count as a property 
according to (P) but also as an individual according to (i)... Such a property would be both a 
property and an individual» (vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 513). 
84 As an example, vallicella cites omniscience. «it is not obviously self-exemplifying (like that exis-
tence exists or self-identity is self-identical), but it is not obviously non-self-exemplifying either 
(like the property of being a teacher of Plato). So the theist is not barred by logic or any canon of 
coherence from taking the view that omniscience is self-exemplifying. if it is self-exemplifying, 
then omniscience is omniscient; but not only that, omniscience = an omniscient individual» 
(vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 514). 
85 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 515.
86 Ibid., p. 516.
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stipulated in the definition of individual, «it follows that each divine attribute 
is a haecceity» 87.
Granting without arguing vallicella’s claim –contra Plantinga– on the 
possibility of self-exemplifying properties and that some properties are indi-
viduals, his account may be acceptable to explain the ontological identity bet-
ween God and His properties, and among God’s properties. But what would 
account for their distinction or multiplicity? in his critique against Stump 
and Kretzmann, vallicella rejects any conceptual distinction saying, «it will 
not help to say that omniscience and omnipotence differ as concepts («in the 
mind») but are identical as properties («outside the mind»), for even if this is 
true, it has not been explained how the properties can be identical with one 
another and with God. The problem is one of metaphysics, not of philosophy 
of language» 88. However, in addressing the metaphysical problem of identity, 
vallicella runs the risk of neglecting that which distinguishes the properties 
from each other and from God, i.e., that which confers meaning to affirma-
tions like «God is just» and «God is merciful».
While acknowledging that the problem is, firstly, ontological, Aquinas’ 
solution seems to indicate that it is also epistemological and linguistic. To at-
tribute multiple predicates to an absolutely simple God, we must distinguish 
first between God as considered in Himself and God as known to us.
God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet 
our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him 
as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under di-
fferent conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corres-
ponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject 
represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by 
composition 89.
our concepts of God represent Him imperfectly because (a) our intellect 
cannot apprehend God «as He is in Himself», and (b) these concepts come from 
87 «Thus, omniscience is the property of being identical to the omniscient being. Given that om-
niscience is self-exemplifying, it follows that the property of being identical to the omniscient 
being is identical to the omniscient being» (vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New De-
fense», p. 516).
88 vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 510.
89 S. Th. i, q. 13, a. 12. in this text, we may already notice that, for Aquinas, divine simplicity is an 
exigency of reason.
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our knowledge of creatures. This accounts for the distinction and the multiplici-
ty of divine predicates 90. Although we think of God under a multiplicity of pre-
dicates, our intellect knows that these refer only to «one and the same object». 
it is because «our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they 
really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which 
there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it 
apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it» 91.
Augustine argues in the same vein when he says that «God is more truly 
thought than he is spoken of and is more truly than he is thought» 92. Roland 
J. Teske observes that Augustine’s distinction between dicere, cogitare and esse 
allows one «to hold that there is a multiplicity of terms used in speaking of 
God and that there is a multiplicity of meanings for those terms, though the 
being of God is simple» 93. What Augustine reminds us of is that we must not 
think of God as we speak of Him, since not even our thought of God is equal 
to His being. We may attribute greatness and goodness to God, but these at-
tributes are not a quantity or a quality distinct from God that inheres in Him 
as in a subject. Augustine claims that the multiple predicates of God are not 
incompatible with the divine simplicity 94. He presupposes that God is not only 
spoken of in multiple terms (multipliciter dicitur) but also in multiple senses 
(multiplicitur cogitatur) since these terms have different meanings. However, 
«one and the same reality is expressed, whether God is said to be eternal or 
immortal or incorruptible or immutable» 95. Thus, as Teske concludes,
though our speech and our thoughts about God are multiple, the being of 
God is simple, for what the different terms with their different meanings 
90 Marilyn Adams sums up Aquinas’ premises into three: «(1) that it makes sense to suppose that for 
some a and b, a and b are really the same but distinct rationes or conceived objects; (2) that a thing 
with no distinguishable constituents of any sort can genuinely correspond to a plurality of distinct 
conceived objects or rationes; and (3) that the human intellect is not capable in this life of forming 
concepts that apply univocally to God and creatures». William ockham tries to refute (1) saying it 
commits a category mistake. Duns Scotus attacks (2) and (3) trying to prove otherwise. (For a con-
cise discussion of Aquinas’ solution to the problem of attribution and its critiques, see AdAMs, M., 
William Ockham, vol. ii, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, indiana, 1987, pp. 914-931).
91 S. Th. i, q. 13, a. 12, ad. 2.
92 AuGustine, The Trinity, 7, 4, 7.
93 teske, r. J., To know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of St. Augustine, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, Washington, D. C., 2008, p. 111.
94 Cfr. AuGustine, The Trinity, 15, 5, 8.
95 AuGustine, The Trinity, 15, 5, 7.
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refer to is one and the same reality. Thus, the doctrine of divine simplicity 
is not a doctrine about our speech about God or about our thoughts about 
God, but about the being of God 96.
The problem of multiple predicates arises when the metaphysical and the 
epistemological spheres get confused so that the simplicity doctrine is cons-
trued as saying «that properties which are different are not different when God 
has them» 97. The distinction is epistemological while the identity is metaphy-
sical. But when multiple predicates are taken as ontologically existing abstract 
entities, coherence problems are inevitable. Aquinas holds that each predicate 
signifies a perfection that both Creator and creature share. Weigel notes that 
«this raises the question of what features inhering in created things would have 
in common with the divine reality» 98. As Marilyn Adams suggests, the real is-
sue is not that multiple predicates imply composition but how the identity of 
the perfection signified is maintained as applied to both Creator and creatures. 
This necessarily calls for a theory of predication that accounts for both the epis-
temological distinction and the metaphysical identity of multiple predicates.
Aquinas’ doctrine of analogical predication and his theory of participa-
tion could answer Adams’ query. God is absolutely one and simple because 
He is Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Yet, multiple predicates which signify perfections 
known through creation can be attributed analogically to God, not only be-
cause they relate to Him as the effects to their cause, but also as participants 
to the participated. «Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in 
God» 99. The attribution is analogical because in creatures, these are partici-
pated perfections, but in God, they are identical with His Being. They must 
be identical, i would say, to God’s Being, for composition is unworthy of a 
truly divine being 100. viewed from this perspective, multiple divine predicates 
cannot render the simplicity doctrine incoherent.
 96 teske, r. J., To know God and the Soul..., p. 97.
 97 Davies believes this is how Plantinga construes the multiple predicates in God (cfr. dAvies, B., 
oP, «Classical Theism...», p. 58).
 98 WeiGel, P., «Divine Simplicity», p. 11.
 99 S. Th. i, q. 13, a. 2.
100 Cfr. S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 7. Aquinas discusses five ways by which God must be absolutely simple. 
Adams discusses four motives for the simplicity doctrine and all of them gears around the idea 
of composition as unworthy of a truly divine being (cfr. AdAMs, M., William Ockham, vol. ii, pp. 
903-908).
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2.4. Predicating Existence
Among God’s multiple predicates, predicating existence is especially pro-
blematic. Simplicity critics argue that if God’s multiple properties are identical 
with one another, then God has only one property. Now, suppose that this one 
property is simplicity. God, then, cannot possess the property of existence. if 
He is simple, he does not exist, and if he exists, he is not simple 101. The identi-
ty claim between God’s essence and His existence is, in Christopher Hughes’ 
words, «perhaps the single most baffling claim Aquinas makes about God» 102. 
Anthony Kenny is even harsher in shrugging it off as «nothing but sophistry 
and illusion» 103. A. N. Prior describes the claim as a «bad grammar, a combi-
ning of words that fails to make them mean-like ‘cat no six’» 104.
But far from being meaningless, Barry Miller argues that the identity 
claim on God’s essence and existence makes sense only when it is understood 
in terms of limit cases rather than limit simpliciter 105. «‘God is His existence’ 
is to be understood as: ‘The limit case instance of an individual = the limit 
case instance of existence’» 106. Miller argues that only when the concept of 
existence as a real property of concrete individuals is understood well, we may 
appreciate the notion of Subsistent Existence as something «basic to an appre-
ciation of God’s nature and simplicity» 107.
Miller rightly notes that the problem of predicating existence hinges on 
the question «What does it mean to be or to exist?» 108 The crux of the matter 
101 Cfr. vAllicellA, W., «Divine Simplicity: A New Defense», p. 509.
102 HuGHes, c., On a Complex Theory of a Simple God, p. 4. Hughes argues that «Aquinas’ full-
strength conception of divine simplicity is unworkable, although a weakened and reconstructed 
conception may not be» (p. ix).
103 kenny, A., Aquinas on Being, p. 194. The same verdict he gives to Aquinas’ thesis in kenny, A., 
Aquinas, oxford University Press, oxford, 1980, p. 60.
104 Prior, A. n., «Can Religion Be Discussed?», in FleW, A. and MAcintyre, A. (eds.), New Essays 
in Philosophical Theology, S.C.M. Press, London, 1955, p. 5. 
105 «A basic difference between a limit simpliciter and a limit case is that the former differs merely 
in degree from that of which it is a limit simpliciter, whereas the latter differs absolutely from 
that of which it is a limit case: the limit simpliciter of an F is an F, whereas the limit case of an F 
is decidedly not an F» (Miller, B., A Most Unlikely God: A Philosophical Enquiry, University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame and London, 1996, p. 7).
106 Miller, B., A Most Unlikely God...», p. 12. 
107 Ibid., p. 14. For Miller’s argument on existence as a real property, see also Miller, B., From 
Existence to God: A Contemporary Philosophical Argument, Routledge, London, 1992, Chapter 4, 
pp. 64-78. 
108 in some languages, the predicate ‘is’ does duty for ‘exists’, and even in English there are ar-
chaic uses of ‘is’ in that role (cfr. Miller, B., «Existence» in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
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is centered on whether or not existence is predicate that can be added to a 
subject. Arguments for each of the opposing views have considerably enlive-
ned the contemporary debates, on which the plight of the simplicity doctrine’s 
coherence question rests.
in the contemporary analytic tradition to which Wolterstorff himself 
admittedly is inscribed, the predominant view on the question may be sum-
marized in two theses: (1) the Frege-Russell distinction of the four different 
meanings of «is», namely, existential, predicative, identificatory, and generic im-
plication 109; and (2) the claim that existence is not a predicate, or to be exact, 
existence is not a first-level property 110. From this, one could already antici-
pate why, on the ground of existence, the simplicity doctrine is incoherent for 
analytic philosophers.
Although, as Alejandro Llano notes, most contemporary analysts admit 
that existence can be a predicate, they take it as a peculiar predicate and not a 
real one 111. To take existence as a real predicate seems to entail a double dilem-
ma: a «referential tautology» and a «referential contradiction» 112. if existence 
were a real property, then, «Socrates exists» would be redundant. Affirmati-
ve existential statements like this would give rise to «the ludicrous situation 
described by David Londey who invited us to ‘reflect on the absurdity of a 
farmer who daily inspected his flock with the aim of sorting the existing from 
the non-existent ones – searching for the stigmata of existence’» 113. Besides, 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/existence/> [Last consulted: october 12, 
2011], p. 2. 
109 For example: «Socrates is» (existential), «Ciceron is Tully» (identificatory); «Socrates is wise» 
(predicative); and «Man is an animal» (generic implication) (cfr. Miller, B., «Existence», 
p. 3).
110 C. J. F. Williams devotes his book «to showing that ‘__exists’ or ‘__is’ cannot be a first-level 
predicate» (WilliAMs, c. J. F., What is Existence?, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1981, p. 181).
111 David Pears claims that «existence is a peculiar kind of predicate» (PeArs, d. F., «is Existence 
a Predicate?» in strAWson, P. F. (ed.), Philosophical Logic, oxford University Press, London, 
1967, p. 100). Llano examines both opposing claims in llAno, A., Metaphysics and Language, 
AlBrecHt, J. W. (trans. & ed.), Georg olms verlag Hildesheim, Germany, 2005, Chapter iii, 
«Being and Existence», pp. 185-254. Miller says that three misconceptions surrounding the no-
tion of existence must be dispelled in order to appreciate better the notion of God as Subsistent 
Existence. First is the claim that existence is not a predicate. Second, if it were, it would be just 
a «Cambridge property». Third, if it were a real property, it would be the most impoverished of 
real properties (cfr. Miller, B., A Most Unlikely God, pp. 15-16). 
112 PeArs, d. F., «is Existence a Predicate?», p. 98.
113 londey, d. G., «Existence», in Philosophia Arhusiensis, 1 (1970), p. 3, cited by Miller, B., From 
Existence to God, p. 64.
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negative existential propositions like «Santa Claus does not exist» would ge-
nerate a paradox for, if «exists» were a predicate, then its negation would also 
be one. Paradoxically, «does not exist» could be attributed to Santa Claus only 
if he did exist.
Presumably, those who deny that existence is a predicate appeal to 
Frege’s thesis that existence is not a property of individuals, but rather, of 
concepts: that it is a second-level predicate 114. «Affirmation of existence is in 
fact nothing but the denial of the number nought» 115. in language, existence 
is properly represented, not by a predicate «exists» but by a quantifier «there 
exists» or «there is». The proposition «Leo Sachse is» should be understood 
to mean that «There is at least one thing that is identical with Leo Sachse». in 
this sense, nothing is being predicated of Leo Sachse. However, something is 
predicated of the property (or concept) of being identical with Leo Sachse 116. 
Now, by assigning this quantifier to concepts, the double dilemma of referen-
tial tautology and contradiction can be avoided 117.
However, existence may not exclusively be a property of concepts only. 
There can be a lot of sense by which existence is a first-level predicate, a 
real property of things. Miller argues that ‘__exists’ can also be predicated 
114 For Frege, concepts and objects are ontological items. «A concept is the reference of a predicate; 
an object is something that can never be the whole reference of a predicate, but can be the refer-
ence of a subject» (FreGe, G., «on Concept and object», in Posthumous Writings, HerMes, H., 
kAMBArtel, F. and kAulBAck, F. (eds.), lonG, P. and WHite, r. (trans.), Blackwell, oxford, 
1979, pp. 100, 105). Predicates attached to singular terms in a proposition that says something 
about the objects to which those terms refer are called first-level predicates or concept expres-
sions. They refer to first-level concepts. Predicates attached to first-level predicates to form 
propositions that say something about the concept to which the first-level predicate refers are 
called second-level predicates. They refer to second-level concepts. Existence belongs to this 
latter category. 
115 FreGe, G., The Foundations of Arithmetic: a logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number 
(Die Grundlagen der Aritmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff 
der Zahl), 2nd rev. ed., Austin, J.l. (trans.), Blackwell, oxford, 1959, p. 65e. «The proposi-
tion that there exists no rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle does state a property of 
the concept ‘rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle’; it assigns to it the number nought» 
(p. 64e).
116 Cfr. FreGe, G., «Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence», in Posthumous Writings, HerMes, H., 
kAMBArtel, F. and kAulBAck, F. (eds.), lonG, P. and WHite, r. (trans.), Blackwell, oxford, 
1979, pp. 53-67.
117 Llano notes that Frege’s proposal «provides a coherent interpretation of Kant’s thesis» which 
says that existence is not a real predicate (cfr. llAno, A., Metaphysics and Language, p. 189). 
That existence is a property of concepts does not mean that concepts exist but that ‘exists’ is of 
concepts, not of things.
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of individuals and is not merely a Cambridge property and that the alleged 
absurdities and paradoxes stem not from taking existence as a real proper-
ty but from taking its negation to be one 118. Now, to deny that «does not 
exist» is a property does not necessarily lead to the denial of existence as 
a property, unless one holds that «understandable but mistaken belief that 
the two denials are inseparable» 119. on the other hand, the suggestion that 
non-existence is a real property rests on whether or not negative existential 
propositions («Santa Claus does not exist») contains a negative existential 
predicate, and this predicate stands for a real property. Miller claims neither 
assumption proves true.
Employing the distinction between internal or predicate negation and 
external or propositional negation, Miller says the negative existential pro-
position «Socrates does not exist» can be rendered as «it is not the case that 
(Socrates exists)» in which, what is predicated of Socrates is existence, not 
its negation. He argues that no negative predicate, then, could stand for a 
real property and concludes that «no matter whether the distinction between 
internal and external negation in this context were accepted or rejected, the 
result would be the same... in neither case, therefore, would ‘Socrates does not 
exist’ generate the paradoxes or absurdities which would make it impossible 
to count ‘exists’ as a first-level predicate and existence as a real property of 
individuals» 120.
Analyzing thoroughly Frege’s thesis, Llano finds out that «existence as a 
property of the concept under which at least one object falls, refers to the exis-
tence of the object itself, which, being presupposed by the application of the 
existential quantifier, can no longer be expressed by the second level existential 
predicate» 121. He, then, concludes that there is another sense of existence that 
refers not only to concepts but to objects 122. He notes that analytic philosophy 
refuses to recognize this second sense. instead, it restricts itself exclusively to 
the first sense «and every time it approaches the second it immediately draws 
118 For Miller’s thorough discussion, see Miller, B., From Existence to God, pp. 64-78. 
119 Miller, B., «Existence», p. 19.
120 Ibid., p. 22.
121 llAno, A., Metaphysics and Language, p. 202. 
122 Llano says, «if we admit the clear distinction Frege makes between concept and object, the 
existence that is predicated of objects must clearly be distinct from that which is predicated of 
concepts» (llAno, A., Metaphysics and Language, p. 210).
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back to imprison itself in the first. Thus it never poses the decisive question 
‘What does existence mean for a real thing?’ in any depth» 123.
Existence as a second-level predicate also faces serious flaws. First, 
«exists» could be taken to mean «instantiates», so that «Dinosaurs exist» 
would mean «The property of being a dinosaur is instantiated at least once». 
But a serious difficulty takes place in accepting the affirmation «Socrates 
exists» to mean «The property of being Socrates is instantiated at least once» 
because individuals cannot be instantiated. As Miller rightly claims, «Rather 
than being themselves instantiable they are the kind of thing in which instan-
tiations occur, e.g. wisdom is instantiated in Socrates, but Socrates himself 
cannot be instantiated in anything» 124.
Second, some philosophers also argue for the distinction of «exists» from 
«is», a position that is directly at odds with the Fregean view which identifies 
«there exists» and «there is». Terence Parsons distinguishes objects that are 
from objects that exist. He uses «exists» to refer to «all the ordinary physical 
(concrete) objects that we normally take to exist (tables, chairs), and it does not 
include unicorns, gold mountains, winged horses, round squares (round square 
things), Pegasus, or Sherlock Holmes» 125. For Parsons, the latter concrete ob-
jects are said not to exist – they are nonexistent, but merely are. He argues that 
what exists does not exhaust what there is 126. For this reason, Miller comments, 
«it is then possible to say without any kind of contradiction, or even paradox, 
‘There are unicorns, but they do not exist’» 127. Edward N. Zalta likewise distin-
guishes «exists» from «is», taking the former as a first-level predicate while the 
latter is predicated of abstract entities. Contrary to Parsons, «is» is represented 
by ‘∃’, indicating that it is a second-level predicate 128.
123 llAno, A., Metaphysics and Language, p. 247. on this point, Llano cites Fernando inciarte saying 
«As long as linguistic analysis does not completely abandon a positivistic spirit it will be unable 
to provide a response to the question, since that response would drag metaphysics along behind 
it» (inciArte, F., El reto del positivismo lógico, Rialp, Madrid, 1974, pp. 130-131). (English trans-
lation by James Albrecht).
124 Miller, B., «Existence», p. 23.
125 PArsons, t., Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980, p. 11.
126 He says that both «Tables exist» and «There are tables» can be symbolized in the same way 
as (Ǝx) Tx, only if we equate the quantifier «there is» with «there exists», «an equation which 
makes sense only if what exists exhausts what there is; and that is the metaphysical view i am now 
questioning» (PArsons, t., Nonexistent Objects, p. 6). 
127 Miller, B., «Existence», p. 29.
128 For a comparison between Parsons’ and Zalta’s position, see Miller, B., «Existence», pp. 28-33.
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in the face of this ongoing debate, one’s initial reaction would be to find a 
common ground that allows mutual understanding and even reconciliation of 
two apparently opposing views. Following Llano, i think recognizing the two 
main senses of existence –existence as a propositional (second-level) predicate 
and existence as a first-level predicate (Aquinas’ act of being)– could provide 
such ground 129. it allows us to see that nothing in the assumption of existence 
as a real predicate opposes to its consideration as a propositional predicate, for, 
as Aquinas says, «‘To be’ can mean either of two things. it may mean the act of 
essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind 
in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking ‘to be’ in the first sense, we cannot 
understand God’s existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We 
know that this proposition which we form about God when we say ‘God is’, 
is true; and this we know from His effects» 130. on this Thomistic distinction, 
existence is viewed not only as a Frege-Kantian property, but also as an act 131.
Unless one keeps a prudent distance from insisting exclusively on the Kan-
tian tendency of separating existence from reality and on the Fregean encase-
ment of existence in concepts, the question on predicating existence would be far 
from being resolved and it would be too hasty to reject the simplicity doctrine as 
incoherent merely on the ground that predicating existence to God is problema-
tic 132. Can such rejection be warranted under the premise that God is a person?
2.5. God as a Person
As we shall see, the attribution of the concept of person to God requires 
careful qualification, for as Weigel rightly observes, «referring to God as a 
129 Llano discusses Aquinas’ distinction between veridical existence and being as act in llAno, A., 
Metaphysics and Language, pp. 226-254. Weigel presents Aquinas’ response to this problem as in-
volving the distinction between «being» in the predication and «being» in reality (cfr. WeiGel, 
P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., pp. 68-78).
130 S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2. Aquinas clarifies that «not everything which are beings in the second way 
are also beings in the first way» (like in privations). Considering this distinction, i think, would 
shed much light on the problem of divine simplicity. 
131 David B. Burrell holds that simplicity doctrine can only be construed coherently if we «conceive 
existence as act (not an act) perfecting the essence as form does matter» (cfr. Burrell, d., «Dis-
tinguishing God from the World», p. 85).
132 Weigel says that, without necessarily getting philosophers to agree on what ultimately existence 
is, a sensible reading of the claim that God is His existence is possible. it simply means that God 
is radically independent and absolutely perfect. That God is Subsistent Existence underscores 
God’s absolute simplicity (cfr. WeiGel, P., «Divine Simplicity», p. 11). 
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person is more complicated than one might think» 133. The most fundamental 
problem comes from the concept itself, its origin and application to God 134. 
obviously, a thorough understanding of the varied sense with which the con-
cept is used in philosophy and theology is indispensable for the accurate com-
prehension of the claim that God is a person 135. Besides, a question looms on 
whether the notion of divine personhood must determine the understanding 
of human personhood, or is it the other way around. in other words, does 
our notion of God as a person determines our idea of human person? or is 
our idea of human person determines our idea of God as person? Plantinga’s 
objection does not seem to give a clear indication with respect to these ques-
tions 136.
originally, the term person, under the Roman law was used to refer to 
someone who is the subject of rights and responsibilities. in the Christian era, 
with its doctrine of man being created in the image and likeness of God, the 
term refers to man’s preeminence due to this dignity. in particular, the un-
derstanding of the notion of person becomes more profound and crystallized 
in the theological reflections of the Fathers of the Church, especially in the 
development and defense of the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas 137.
133 WeiGel, P., «Divine Simplicity», p. 8.
134 Richard Swinburne observes that some philosophers, for various reasons, prefer to describe God 
as «personal but not a person», avoiding in this way numerous problems (cfr. sWinBurne, r., 
The Coherence of Theism, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1997, p. 99).
135 Stanley Rudman says «in its long history, ‘person’ has meant a number of things» (rudMAn, 
s., Concepts of Person and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997, p. 4). 
Rudman’s book is a thorough analysis of the concept of personhood, its application to God and 
human beings, and its relation to Christian ethic.
136 For Plantinga, God has knowledge and will and God acts; hence, He is a person. Now, since 
our model for knowing, willing and acting is the human person, it seems that Plantinga’s model 
for person is the human being. Davies argues, «if people are our models for persons, then in 
an obvious sense God, it would seem, is not a person» (dAvies, B., oP, «Classical Theism...», 
p. 65).
137 The meaning of the Latin verb personare, which means «to make loud, continuous, pervasive 
noise» could be traced from the Greek pròsopon, which literally means «face» or «mask» and is 
derived from Greek theatre, in which actors on a stage wore masks to reveal their character and 
emotional state to the audience. it could also be traced from the expression «per se sonans» (one 
who has a voice by himself), from which the Roman law’s definition of person is derived: persona 
est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the term 
«person», see sellés, J. F., La persona humana: introducción e historia, Parte i, Universidad de Sa-
bana, Colombia, 1998. See also GArcíA cuAdrAdo, J. A., Antropología filosófica: una introducción 
a la filosofía del hombre, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2004, pp. 119-124.
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Assuming Boethius’ classical definition, but giving it a more profound 
interpretation, Aquinas defines person as subsistens rationale or all subsistent 
being with a rational nature 138. For him, person is an individual substance 
that possesses its own being. By the term subsistence, Aquinas emphasizes the 
incommunicability and individuality of this substance. He adds that such sub-
sistent being is of rational nature, which means that, in the first place, the indi-
vidual substance is distinguished from its nature of which it is the suppositum, 
and secondly, by being rational, it is open to the world that surrounds it. This 
distinction between nature and its suppositum enables the Angelic Doctor to 
affirm that actions belong to the suppositum, not to the nature 139.
The Scholastic account views person in terms of being: the radical nature 
of personhood resides in the personal act of being. At the advent of Carte-
sian rationalism, the term person is founded, not anymore on the act of being, 
but on the faculties of thinking and their corresponding operations. Person 
is now understood in terms of self-consciousness. This understanding of per-
son in terms of doing, rather than of being, extends even in the contemporary 
milieu 140. in his analysis of what is meant by ‘person’, Richard Swinburne as-
sumes that a person is «an individual who thought and perhaps talked, made 
moral judgments, wanted this and not that, knew things, favored this suppliant 
and not that, etc.» 141. if an individual does all these, among others, then it is 
natural to call him a «person». i assume that it is in this context that we may 
interpret Plantinga and Wolterstorff’s view that God is a person.
According to this view, persons are not abstract objects but are composite 
and changeable. They have intellect and will – faculties which involve compo-
sition and a temporal sequence of states. Hence, no person is absolutely sim-
ple. As David Hume argues, «A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are 
not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable, 
is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no 
138 Cfr. S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 1. Person is «naturae rationalis individual substantia» (cfr. BoetHius, Liber 
de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium, c. 3). 
139 Cfr. tHoMAs AquinAs, Summa contra Gentiles iv, c. 35, Anderson, J. F., Bourke, v. J. and 
o’neil, c. J. (trans.), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2001-2003. (From here 
on, ScG); cfr. also S. Th. iii, q. 2, a. 2. 
140 «Ya en la filosofía contemporánea se sigue afirmando la radicalidad personal no en el ser, sino en 
el obrar» (GArcíA cuAdrAdo, J. A., Antropología filosófica..., p. 122).
141 sWinBurne, r., The Coherence of Theism, p. 102.
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hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all» 142. But it is a unanimously embraced 
tenet that God is doubtlessly a person. Then, He is obviously not simple.
What becomes quite clear in this view is that the model concept of per-
son applied to the divinity is the human personhood. But if this observation is 
correct, then we are faced with two serious setbacks: for while human persons 
are embodied and temporal, God is disembodied and timeless. But how can 
the concept of human personhood be a model for divine personhood, or vice 
versa, without falling into these pitfalls 143?
on the problem of embodiment, Swinburne’s solution is to show the co-
herence of the claim that the concept of personhood does not require material 
embodiment. if it succeeds, then, it would be non-problematic to affirm: «That 
God is a person, yet one without a body, seems the most elementary claim of 
theism» 144. Rudman, however, rejects Swinburne’s solution alleging that embo-
diment is an essential feature of the notion of person. «There are good reasons 
for the emphasis on embodiment. The persons we are most familiar with, other 
human agents, are, without exception, embodied. And the body plays a cru-
cial role in philosophical discussions of personal identity... in opting to defend 
the idea of God as a bodiless person, Swinburne is turning his back on one of 
the most essential features of a person» 145. Besides, the notion of a disembo-
died person, says Rudman, «is not consonant with the main tenor of biblical 
revelation» 146. He suggests that we view God as an embodied person, but taking 
embodiment in terms of in non-corporeal terms. He calls it «non-corporeal 
embodiment» 147. But how can we identify God’s embodiment non-corporeally?
142 HuMe, d., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, PoPkin, r. (ed.), Hackett, indianapolis, iN, 
1980, part 4. 
143 Stanley Rudman points out «a stronger thesis» which claims that «the conception of divine 
personhood should be, or, even more strongly, is determinative of, the understanding of human 
personhood...» and that this thesis faces also these two serious problems (rudMAn, s., Concepts 
of Person..., p. 145).
144 sWinBurne, r., The Coherence of Theism, p. 99.
145 rudMAn, s., Concepts of Person..., p. 148). Peter van inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, in a very 
substantial collection of essays, have gathered recent philosophical explorations of the nature of 
persons from the idealist, dualist, materialist, immaterialist and Christian perspectives (see vAn 
inWAGen, P. and ziMMerMAnn, d. (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine, Clarendon Press, oxford, 
2007).
146 rudMAn, s., Concepts of Person..., p. 149.
147 Ibid., p. 148. Rudman cites Jonathan Harrison’s article in which the latter discusses five things 
we mean when we say that this body is my body: (1) it is a source of sensations, (2) the inside of 
this body is experienced, (3) its parts can be moved directly, (4) it is my vantage-point in observ-
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Rudman cites P. F. Strawson’s idea of construing individual person as «a 
unified and embodied personal agent» by avoiding the traditional mind-body 
dualism. Now, in identifying God’s «non-corporeal embodiment», Rudman 
suggests the story-relative mode of identification, in which God is identified 
as an embodied personal agent in His relationship with all the characters of 
an empirically grounded narrative. This mode of identification, says Rudman, 
allows us to identify God as ‘Creator and Redeemer’ within the Jewish and 
Christian narratives. He notes,
if narrative-relative identification offers a promising way forward, then, 
although there is no neutral identification of God –how could there be?– we 
can understand divine embodiment and agency on two different levels: in 
terms of incarnation and the narratives reporting this. it is true that, on this 
view, God is not embodied in exactly the same way as the human person, 
except in the incarnation, but the numerous problems of substance dualism 
can be genuinely overcome, and it is possible to attribute personhood to 
God and human agents in a non-equivocal sense 148.
it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the merits of Rudman’s 
claim. But let it be pointed out that his effort to preserve the conceptual link 
between person and embodiment that would allow the non-equivocal attribu-
tion of personhood to both God and human beings, avoiding along the way 
the problem of substance dualism (God has no body; human beings are em-
bodied), is quite congruent with Plantinga’s objection and with Wolterstorff’s 
notion of God as a person. What is not quite clear is whether Wolterstorff 
thinks along Rudman’s notion of «non-corporeal divine embodiment». But 
like Rudman, Wolterstorff also tends to attribute univocally the concept of 
personhood to God and human beings. And he does so with the hope of main-
taining consonance with what he claims to be the biblical concept of God. 
Such consonance with the biblical tradition is further upheld in his notion of 
ing the world, and (5) it affects my thoughts and feelings (cfr. HArrison, J., «The Embodiment 
of Mind, or what use is having a body?», in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74 (1974), pp. 
33-55. Although Swinburne has reservations regarding the fifth, he concedes that «a person 
has a body if there is a material object to which he is related in all of the above five ways... and 
presumably that he is embodied only to some degree» if he is related to a material object «in 
only some of these ways» (sWinBurne, r., The Coherence of Theism, p. 99). 
148 rudMAn, s., Concepts of Person..., p. 151.
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divine eternity – an argument that, in fact, Rudman cites to support his answer 
to the second objection to God’s personhood, namely, that God is timeless 
while persons are temporal.
it seems that timelessness and personhood are two contradicting attribu-
tes of God. For as J. R. Lucas notes, «To say that God is outside time, as many 
theologians do, is to deny, in effect, that God is a person» 149. Now, if God, as 
the Bible presents Him, is a person who intervenes in human history, then 
divine timelessness would be counterintuitive. Lucas argues that if we want to 
sustain divine personhood, we have to let go of divine timelessness or at least, 
suggest a mitigated explanation of divine eternity that would still allow the 
attribution of time-related activities to God.
Rudman admits that God transcends time. But he maintains that the 
notion of timelessness is insufficient to explain God’s intervention in his-
tory 150. What seems to be inchoate in Rudman is elucidated in Wolterstorff 
when the latter argues that divine eternity should not be understood in terms 
of timelessness but of an endless time: God is not eternal but everlasting. 
Although he tries to back up this claim with some analysis on the nature of 
time, Wolterstorff’s main ground of espousing divine everlastingness is ob-
viously biblical. The Bible presents God as a being who acts within temporal 
succession. if, indeed, He is a person, then, He must not be timeless but ever-
lasting 151.
149 Lucas writes: «The Absolute, to on, the Form of the Good, or even, perhaps, the Ground of 
our Being, may be outside time, and timeless in a full-blooded Platonic sense, but they are not 
persons: they neither see what we are, nor hearken unto our prayers, nor care what we do, let 
alone intervene in the course of the world’s events. if we think of God as a living person, who 
acts in the world, or even who is merely conscious, we must seem to be ready to apply temporal 
expressions to Him, because the applicability of temporal predicates of some sort or other is a 
necessary condition of activity, even the inactive activity of consciousness» (lucAs, J. r., Treatise 
on Time and Space, Methuen, 1973, p. 300). 
150 «God is not in time as creatures are in time, however, and it is important to note significant ways 
in which God transcends time. God is to be understood as the ground, or creator, of time... God 
is the Lord of time, not subject to its vicissitudes in the way that human beings are. Although 
he does not determine the details of every event or prevent free agency, he is not limited by the 
passage and ravages of time... God, as understood by Christians, is a God who intervenes in 
history and is capable of exercising initiative in relation to our temporal existence. This means 
that God’s relation to time is not adequately conveyed by ‘timelessness’... God is not subject to 
measured time, but neither is he simply above time or timeless» (rudMAn, s., Concepts of Per-
son..., p. 157).
151 A detailed treatment of his theory is discussed in Divine Eternity, Awareness and Action of this 
chapter.
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As we have seen, in order to preserve a non-equivocal attribution of 
personhood across the human and divine sphere, or at least their own con-
cept of personhood, these thinkers are willing to modify the concepts of 
embodiment and eternity. Despite these efforts, a feeling of disappointment 
endures. Rudman articulates it accurately: «in terms of embodiment and 
temporality, it is clear that God is not physically embodied or literally in/
subject to time. There are good reasons... for not thinking of God as ‘a per-
son’ like other persons, even if we revise the understanding of timelessness 
to take account of God’s temporal relationship to the created order... He is 
not ‘a person’ without qualification. The idea of God as ‘a person’ remains 
genuinely problematic» 152. if this is true –and i think it is– then, the most 
appropriate move is to abandon these efforts and to view the concept of 
person reconsidering the classical perspective. Doing this may shed light on 
Plantinga’s objection.
What we need is a concept of person that safeguards both the radical 
distinction and the close similarity between God and human beings for two 
obvious reasons. First, it is inconceivable that to say «God is a person» means 
univocally the same as saying «Socrates is a person». Second, our concept of 
human personhood, being immediate and empirical, is the springboard of our 
notion of divine personhood 153. Thus, the concept must be applicable, at least 
analogically, to both.
However, in a notion of personhood that places more emphasis on doing 
rather than on being and identifies personhood with its operations (thinking, 
willing, feeling, etc.), we can hardly comply with this criterion; unless it is 
maintained that divine operations are radically distinct from human actions. 
in the latter case, we would be obliged to espouse a radical distinction in being, 
on the ground that action follows being. Besides, personal actions are mere 
manifestations of personhood. Thinking, loving, willing, speaking, etc., may 
be very personal but they are not identical with being a person 154. Hence, the 
152 rudMAn, s., Concepts of Person..., p. 158.
153 Although i agree with Weigel in saying that human personhood does not have to be the defini-
tive model of persons, much less, of divine personhood.
154 i may be thinking but i am not my act of thinking. i may know all my actions but I (my being 
a person) am not and cannot be identical either with my knowing them or with them. Juan 
Fernando Sellés argues in the same vein when he writes: «Nosotros podemos conocer todo 
aquello que está en nuestras manos... y todo aquello que forma parte de nuestras manifesta-
ciones, a saber, actos, hábitos y virtudes, potencias, las ideas, los quereres, etc. Somos noso-
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only option left for us is to abandon the contemporary perspective and embra-
ce the notion of personhood in terms of act of being.
The concept of person that Aquinas applies to God, i submit, complies 
with our requirement for it neither applies equivocally nor univocally to God 
and human beings 155. For the Angelic Doctor, «‘person’ signifies what is most 
perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hen-
ce, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, inasmuch as 
His essence contains every perfection, this name ‘person’ is fittingly applied 
to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent 
way» 156. As Weigel notes, «The overall context suggests Aquinas regards the 
term as mainly honorific, in the way God is thought of as a king on account 
of his rule over creation» 157. Hence, if God is called a person, it is because 
His essence contains every perfection and because «the dignity of the divine 
nature excels every dignity» 158.
But when we say «God is a person», does «person» signify God’s es-
sence? Aquinas distinguishes, in this respect, «person» as applied to human 
beings and to God. Applied to the former, the term signifies the essence, as in-
dividual substance of the rational nature. However, when attributed to God, a 
difficulty arises because it runs in contrast to the predication of God as Three 
Divine Persons. Thus, Aquinas argues,
Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin... while relation in 
God... is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine es-
sence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is 
God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies 
a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, 
tros mismos, cada quien, el que conoce esto porque es suyo. Pero el quien del que conoce no 
aparece ante la mirada del que conoce al conocer esas realidades» (sellés, J. F., La persona 
humana: Parte iii, núcleo personal y manifestaciones, Universidad de la Sabana, Colombia, 1998, 
p. 22).
155 «The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more 
common... So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of di-
vine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word ‘person’ is used in an 
equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of 
God and creatures» (S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 4, ad. 4). 
156 S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 3.
157 WeiGel, P., «Divine Simplicity», p. 9.
158 S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 4, ad 2.
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and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although 
in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. 
Thus it is true to say that the name «person» signifies relation directly, and 
the essence indirectly 159.
i think this distinction between person-as-essence and person-as-relation is 
crucial in understanding the theistic claim that God is a person. Although 
Aquinas also concedes that «person» as applied to God signifies essence di-
rectly and relation indirectly, but only «inasmuch as the essence is the same 
as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by 
the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person 
indirectly» 160, still, that God is a person should not be construed without qua-
lifications, much less, in a univocal sense.
Moreover, a further elucidation on the notion of human personhood is 
in place in order to see how we should be wary in predicating it to God, parti-
cularly in using it as a premise for any claim about divine nature. in his book, 
Antropología Trascendental, Leonardo Polo distinguishes personal from Aqui-
nas’ metaphysical act of being 161. The former, he says, is irreducible to the latter 
because while the metaphysical act of being is characterized by existence, the 
personal act of being does not merely exists, but co-exists. Polo defines human 
person, then, as co-existence, co-being. He says,
De entrada, admitiendo que ser y existir son expresiones equivalentes en 
metafísica, la antropología trascendental es la doctrina acerca del co-ser hu-
mano o bien de la co-existencia. El hombre no se limita a ser, sino que 
co-es. Co-ser designa la persona, es decir, la realidad abierta en intimidad y 
también hacia fuera; por tanto, co-ser alude a ser-con. El ser que estudia la 
metafísica equivale a existir (por lo tanto, a persistir). La antropología no se 
reduce a la metafísica porque el ser humano es más que existir o ser, en tanto 
que co-ser o co-existir; y, por tanto, ser-con (desde luego, con el ser de la 
159 S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 4.
160 S. Th. i, q. 29, a. 4.
161 in citing Polo’s view, i wish to assume two things: first, that understanding personhood in 
terms of act of being, as Polo does, is more enlightening to the claim «God is a person»; 
second, taking Polo’s definition of the human person as co-existence is more promising than 
the contemporary view in providing solution to the problem of predicating the concept of 
«person» to God. 
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metafísica). La historia de la metafísica tradicional es el desarrollo de la con-
sideración del ser en sentido principal. En tanto que conviene añadir el tema 
del ser humano como irreductible al ser metafísico, habrá que entenderlo, 
insisto, como co-ser 162.
Therefore, that «God is a person» may mean either that God is His Act 
of Being, the latter being the Perfection of all God’s perfections, or that God 
is Subsistent Relation. in this sense, Plantinga is right that God cannot be a 
property, if by this term, we refer to the perfections that God has. For the 
simplicity doctrine does not claim that God has perfections, rather, that God 
is His perfections. if Aquinas is right in claiming that personhood entails perfec-
tion, then, God is rightly called a person. But this cannot be used as a premise 
against the divine simplicity.
At this juncture, we have seen that the contemporary debate on divine 
simplicity revolves around an interpretative account of the doctrine that either 
misinterprets its original notion in favor of some concept of property (pro-
perty-interpretation) or neglects the original notion of existence and person 
by which the doctrine is understood in its classic formulation. Wolterstorff’s 
diagnosis is quite enlightening as it unravels the roots of the contemporary 
bafflement over the doctrine.
3. WolterstorFF And divine siMPlicity
What caught Wolterstorff’s attention with the coherence question on 
divine simplicity is the fact that a medieval thinker would find the theistic 
identity claims ontologically non-problematic, whereas so many contempo-
rary thinkers consider them inscrutable and incoherent 163. He surmises that 
this may be due to a clash between two fundamentally different ontological 
styles, which he calls constituent and relation ontology.
162 Polo, l., Antropología trascendental: la persona humana, Tomo i, 2ª ed., EUNSA, Pamplona, 
2003, p.29. it is the person who thinks (the «i» that is thought of does not). The being that is 
expressed in proposition is only the being that is thought of. That is why, thinking is act, a radi-
cal act, which allows that person is co-being: an intimacy capable of assimilating every being that 
exists.
163 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 94.
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3.1. Constituent vs. Relation Ontology
When Aristotle affirms that we can make the substance of sensible parti-
culars either something that exists apart from the sensible objects or something 
that is immanent in them, he is giving a hint –perhaps, unconsciously– for a 
distinction between two ontological approaches. Michael Loux suggests that 
«the context for the distinction is a certain philosophical project... that of 
explaining why familiar particulars have the character they do, why, that is, 
they fall under the kinds and exhibit the properties we, in our prephilosophi-
cal thinking, associate with them» 164. What is basically assumed is that either 
these particulars exhibit the character they have derivatively or dependently, 
that is, in virtue of another, or they do so by their own right. Both accounts for 
character derivation give rise to two distinct metaphysical styles.
Wolterstorff calls these styles constituent and relation ontologies 165. Consti-
tuent ontology claims that concrete particulars derive the character or proper-
ties that they exhibit from entities that constitute or compose them. in con-
trast, relation ontology holds that concrete particulars derive their properties 
from abstract entities that exist apart from them. Concrete particulars exhibit 
their properties by virtue of some relation to those abstract entities, either by 
participation, exemplification or instantiation.
To understand better this distinction, we need to go back to Aristotle’s 
notion of the relationship between substance and accidents, which, in the ter-
minology of Fernando inciarte, has something to do with the distinction bet-
ween «ontology of substance» and «ontology of events» 166. inciarte makes 
164 loux, M., «Aristotle’s Constituent ontology», in ziMMerMAn, D. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Meta-
physics, vol. 2, oxford University Press, oxford, 2006, p. 207. Loux believes that Aristotle and 
Wolterstorff refer to the same contrast between these two ontological styles although using 
different languages.
165 Loux characterizes the difference in mereological terms. on constituent approach, the prop-
erties or constituents of sensible things «are something like ingredients or parts of those 
things» while on relational approach, «they exist apart from the sensible and it is in virtue of 
standing in some non-mereological relation to those items that familiar particulars have the 
character they do» (loux, M., «Aristotle’s Constituent ontology», p. 208). i think the dis-
tinction could be grasped better with Aristotle’s distinction between substance and accidents 
as we shall later see. 
166 «Se trata de dos tipos de ontología que por lo general se consideran como contrapuestos entre 
sí... Porque existe algún tipo de contraposición entre la ontología de la sustancia y la llamada 
ontología del evento parece incontrovertible. Para darse cuenta de ello basta con considerar que 
ya en Aristóteles... se da una clara distinción entre sustancia y evento desde el momento en que 
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clear that, for Aristotle, «To be a subject of properties cannot be the main 
meaning of substance or ούσία. Each material substance must have, for rea-
sons still to be shown, some essential properties or an essence with which to 
identify itself» 167. Aristotle, he says, shows how the essence of each substance 
cannot contain any matter at all, whether sensible or intelligible. Thus, «the 
first substance, i. e. the first meaning of the ούσία of material things, cannot 
be a mere subject of properties, because this would in the end be pure mat-
ter and that means something undetermined, a bare particular, as it is called 
nowadays. But first substance cannot be a specific essence either, like man or 
horse or oak, for such an essence still includes matter...instead, the first subs-
tance must be the pure form as first actuality, e.g., the soul of Socrates» 168.
in this manner, inciarte explains how Aristotle arrives at identifying subs-
tance with its essence, taken here as individual form 169. Thus, «First substance, 
πρώτη ούσία, means here pure form in the sense of actuality as opposed to 
potentiality» 170. Accidents, on the other hand, «are nothing more than the 
changing states in which a substance may exist» 171. inciarte confers on Kant 
the merit of having recovered this aspect of Aristotle’s substance-accidents 
distinction, which has been gradually lost in time 172. in Kant’s construal of 
Aristotle, says inciarte, accidents are not something that is related with subs-
tance, but like substance itself in one of its multiple and changing states 173. 
But inciarte is quick to note that while in Kant, substance is mere phainomenon 
la primera está estrechamente relacionada con el concepto de acto y la segunda con el concepto 
de proceso o movimiento...» (inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje: ensayos de metafísica, FlA-
MArique, l. (ed.), EUNSA, Pamplona, 2004, p. 70). 
167 inciArte, F., First Principles, Substance and Action: Studies in Aristotle and Aristotelianism, FlA-
MArique, l. (ed.), Georg olms, verlag Hildesheim, 2005, p. 23.
168 inciArte, F., First Principles..., p. 23. inciarte points this out as Aquinas’ point of departure from 
the Philosopher.
169 For discussion on this question, see inciArte, F., First Principles..., pp. 199-204.
170 inciArte, F., First Principles..., p. 23. «The individual form alone is first substance... this is a 
thesis i myself am strongly inclined to accept» (p. 193).
171 inciArte, F., First Principles..., p. 188.
172 «La tesis que quisiera defender en mi ponencia es que... Kant recuperó un aspecto de la relación 
entre sustancia y accidentes en la Metafísica de Aristóteles que se había ido perdiendo progresi-
vamente en el lapso de tiempo entre los dos, Aristóteles y Kant» (inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, 
lenguaje..., p. 69). 
173 inciarte paraphrases Kant’s statement in Critique of Pure Reason (A 186/B 230) in these words: 
«más exacto que considerar a los accidentes como algo que se relacione de algún modo con la 
sustancia, es considerarlos como la sustancia misma en uno de sus múltiples y cambiantes esta-
dos» (inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje..., p. 71).
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(thus, it cannot exhibit an essence or proper form that guarantees its indivi-
duality), in Aristotle, substance is identical to its essence or individual form 174.
Unlike Duns Scotus, who espouses a formal distinction a parte re bet-
ween substance and accidents, Aristotle holds that such distinction is one of 
reason only, although cum fundamento in re 175. in Aquinas, inciarte notes that 
the distinction is more than just mere distinction of reason cum fundamen-
to in re 176. Substance and accidents are really distinct from one another but 
only conceptually for «it is only after abstracting conceptually from the substance, 
from which accidents cannot really be separated, that it is possible to define 
accidents in general (i.e. including compounds of substance and accident) as if 
they have an essence of their own» 177.
Now, since there is nothing in the mind that does not pass through the 
senses, we come to know the substance or essence through its accidents. But 
the intellect is not limited to grasping only the accidents; it knows the entire 
being with all its characteristics. Besides, «in the process of knowing the spe-
cific individual being, we constantly go back and forth from the substance to 
the accidents, and vice-versa» 178. But with the empiricism of John Locke, this 
view has been challenged 179.
For Locke, substance is «nothing but the supposed but unknown sup-
port of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine 
re substante, without something to support them, (and) we call that support 
substantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English 
‘standing under’ or ‘upholding’» 180. He insists that the idea of substance is 
something that we infer –not perceive– as a substratum of the simple ideas 
(secondary qualities) produced in us through sensible perception by primary 
174 Cfr. inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje..., pp. 75-76.
175 inciarte clarifies: «el fundamento in re de la distinción... es el hecho de que la sustancia... se 
mueve... que cambia constante o, tal vez incluso, continuamente de estado... Por lo menos según 
Kant, esto significa a su vez que la distinción entre sustancia y accidentes se reduce al hecho de 
que los accidentes no son otra cosa que los diversos estados por los que la sustancia pasa en el 
curso de su existencia» (inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje..., p. 72).
176 For discussion, see inciArte, F., Tiempo, sustancia, lenguaje..., pp. 78-81.
177 inciArte, F., First Principles..., p. 191.
178 AlvirA, t., clAvell, l. and Melendo, t., Metaphysics, suPAn, l. (trans.), Sinag-tala Publish-
ers, inc., Manila, 1991, p. 56.
179 i thank Prof. Enrique Moros for helping me see how relational ontology could be traced back 
to Locke’s notion of knowing substances.
180 locke, J., An Essay..., ii, 23, 2, 
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qualities (accidents). Particular substances, then, are «nothing but several 
combinations of simple ideas... it is by such combinations of simple ideas, and 
nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves» 181. 
on this Lockean epistemology, essence, then, is nothing but a result of the 
intellect’s capacity to infer, to suppose or to relate one idea with another.
Thus, we have before us a clear analysis of the distinction between cons-
tituent and relational ontologies. As Enrique Moros notes, what lies behind it 
is the difference between the classical and the contemporary notions of essen-
ce. Wolterstorff says,
According to the dominant style of 20th century, the essence of an entity is 
something to which it bears a certain relation – the relation of necessarily 
exemplifying it... The pattern is clear: twentieth-century ontology is relent-
lessly relational in its style. We don’t think of entities as being composites 
of constituents but as standing in multiple relationships with other entities. 
And naturally God stands in relationships too. A medieval looking at our 
ontology would find acknowledgment of essence just missing. We talk about 
the properties of things; and some of those properties we call the essence of 
the thing. But nowhere do we give ontological acknowledgment to what an 
entity is as such. What we call the essence of an entity would by a medieval 
be regarded as something whose instance is a non-contingent accident of 
the entity 182.
in his analysis, Moros perceives a kind of substitution of the classical 
view and suggests that we avoid the danger of taking these two ontologies as 
constituting «a perfect parallelism» 183. While on constituent ontology, essen-
ce refers to concrete, natural beings, which exists independently and is ante-
rior to their comprehension or intelligibility, on relational ontology, essence 
refers fundamentally to the intelligibility or quiddity of concrete particulars, 
which now becomes ontologically anterior to nature. The consequences of 
such substitution will determine whether philosophy has gained or lost in its 
quest for the ultimate knowledge of reality. For obviously, on the former, what 
181 Ibid., ii, 23, 6.
182 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», pp. 107-108.
183 «Pero conviene, desde ahora mismo, que rechacemos toda ilusión de que entre ambas onto-
logías se produzca sin más un perfecto paralelismo que permita un sencillo parangón» (Mo-
ros, e., Modalidad y esencia..., p. 290).
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we know of things (their quiddity) corresponds to what they really are (being). 
But on the latter, this is not necessarily so. As Moros rightly observes,
En tal situación los entes no tienen un interno ser que los constituye como 
tales y marca desde la intimidad su desenvolvimiento. Ya no hay interior, 
una intimidad propia de las cosas que pueda desvelar nuestro pensamiento. 
Lo que nuestra capacidad cognoscitiva puede alcanzar son las relaciones que 
cada uno de los seres mantienen con los demás. Pero ninguna de estas rela-
ciones es un constituyente del ser 184.
in trying to show how the three theistic identity claims are baffling 
within the relational style but non-problematic with the constituent one, 
Wolterstorff says his point is not that «working in the style of constituent on-
tology automatically makes the theistic identity claims non-problematic, but 
rather that working in the style of relation ontology automatically makes them 
problematic» 185. This comment alone could already give us a clue that, per-
haps, the defect is not on the theistic identity claims, but on the styles. Besides, 
if the simplicity doctrine is internally coherent, it must not be by virtue of a 
coherent approach, but the other way around. For it is not our way of looking 
at things that constitute the way things are.
3.1.1. God is identical with His Essence
For constituent ontologists, to identify God with His essence or nature 
would be unproblematic because, for him, «an essence or nature was just as 
concrete as that of which it is the nature» 186. For a relation ontologist, things 
do have essences.
Naturally the medieval will speak of something as having a certain nature. 
But the having here is to be understood as having as one of its constituents. very 
much of the difference between medieval and contemporary ontology hangs 
on these two different construals of «having». Whereas for the medievals, 
184 Moros, e., Modalidad y esencia..., p. 289.
185 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 107. 
186 Ibid., p. 101. He emphasizes that for a medieval, the nature of a thing is what-it-is-as-such. «An 
entity does not have a certain nature... it is a certain nature» (WolterstorFF, n., «Divine 
Simplicity», p. 101).
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having an essence was having an essence as one of its constituents, for us, ha-
ving an essence is having an essence as one of its properties: exemplifying it 187.
As Wolterstorff puts it, for medieval thinkers like Aquinas, corporeal 
beings are composed of nature or essence and individuating matter – which me-
dievals see as two really existing constituents of concrete individuals. An incor-
poreal God, then, could easily be identified with His nature since He lacks indi-
viduating matter 188. i agree with Rogers in holding that Wolterstorff’s analysis is 
questionable. Wolterstorff, Rogers claims, is mistaken on three points.
First, to speak of a medieval view on the ontological status of natures 
or essences seems erroneous for it was one of the most debated issues in the 
middle ages. Second, the 20th-century view of things as having essences and 
of essences as properties was something that Abelard already advanced in the 
12th century as a modern view. Lastly, contrary to Wolterstorff’s claim, Aqui-
nas, good Aristotelian that he is, does not hold natures as concrete things like 
particulars. Rogers adds,
True, according to Aquinas, in the case of incorporeal individuals the indi-
vidual is identified with its form, but this does not explain divine simplicity. 
The angels are incorporeal. For them there is no individuating matter, and 
so each angel is a species unto itself. But the angels are not simple the way 
God is... their essence is not identical with their existence. only God, the 
absolutely necessary being, is perfectly simple. Thus Wolterstorff’s analysis 
does not seem to capture Aquinas’ position on divine simplicity 189.
Curiously enough, Wolterstorff alleges to have found in Aquinas’ expo-
sition on God’s identity with His essence or nature, some elements that Mann 
affirms in his theory of property instances 190. He claims:
it is Aquinas’ view that humanity, i.e., human nature, has as its instances the 
various particularized human natures to be found in reality – Socrates’ na-
ture, Plato’s nature, etc. Not human beings, but human natures, are the ins-
187 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 101. one would immediately notice here Aristo-
tle’s distinction between taking the substance of sensible objects as something that exists either 
«apart from» them (essence that stands in relation to these objects) or «within» them (essence 
as constitutive of these objects).
188 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 102-103. 
189 roGers, k., «The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 165-166, note no. 2.
190 Wolterstorff cites Aquinas’ respondeo of S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 3.
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tances of humanity – each human being including in its composite a human 
nature but always more than that as well. But what, then, about the property 
of being a human being? What does this have as its instances? The instances 
of this property will be human beings. But obviously human beings are also 
the entities that exemplify this property. in the case of such ‘individuating’ 
properties as this, then, exemplification and instance coincide – rather than 
for those properties that Mann calls «rich» 191.
it is not difficult to detect in this interpretation some elements of the 
relational approach applied to Aquinas’ thought. if my analysis is correct, then 
Wolterstorff may have fallen into some conceptual anachronism in his cons-
trual of Aquinas. Firstly, Wolterstorff contends that Aquinas works with the 
constituent approach. Hence, why would he (Aquinas) view humanity as so-
mething instantiated in «various particularized human natures», instantiation 
being a relational concept peculiar to Thomistic ontology? Secondly, Aquinas 
does not regard essence (of composite entities, like humanity) as a separately 
existing abstract entity, but something that subsists in a suppositum (although it 
must differ from it) 192. if that is so, how could we assume that he views particu-
larized human natures as instances of humanity? 193 Besides, what is the point of 
asking about the «property of being a human being» and of claiming that it is in 
this «individuating» property –not in Mann’s «rich» property– that exemplifi-
cation and instance coincide, if what we have at hand is a Thomistic ontology?
3.1.2. God’s Essence is identical with His Existence
As to the God’s identity with His existence, Wolterstorff concludes that 
«The principal problem in this area will be to explain how, for an entity that 
exists necessarily, there can yet be something that accounts for its existence» 194. 
«Accounting for» is the concept with which Wolterstorff understands Aqui-
191 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 104.
192 Aquinas seems to insist the necessity of construing essence or nature as subsisting in a suppositum, 
that even «in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to 
individual matter –that is to say, to ‘this’ matter– the very forms being individualized of them-
selves – it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting ‘supposita’» (S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 3). 
193 in relational ontology, the essence or property must be held as existing apart from what exempli-
fies or instantiates it so as to stand in relation to it, that is, to make exemplification or instantia-
tion possible.
194 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 106. (Emphasis is mine.)
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nas’ notion of how a necessarily existing Being is identical with His essence. 
Wolterstorff concedes that «if a thing exists contingently, then one cannot 
account for its existence just by referring to its essence; whereas, for example, 
to account for why a horse is an animal, one just points to its nature» 195. in the 
case of necessarily existing entities, Wolterstorff muses that perhaps for some 
their existence is distinct from their essence «for it may be that for certain 
necessarily existing entities, there is something external to them that accounts 
for why they exist» 196. He does not elaborate.
i submit that Wolterstorff’s concept of «accounting for» falls short of 
Aquinas’ concept of causality 197. in citing Aquinas’ contention, «that thing, 
whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by 
another» 198, Wolterstorff thinks that «clearly he (Aquinas) intends to affirm 
the converse as well. it was the uniform conviction of the medievals that there 
is nothing other than God’s nature that accounts for why God exists. Hence, God’s 
existence is not distinct from God’s essence – as also, for example, Bucephalus’ 
equinity is not distinct from Bucephalus’ essence» 199.
However, Wolterstorff misinterprets the claim «there is nothing other 
than God’s nature that accounts for why God exists» to mean that God’s exis-
tence follows necessarily from His essence. in his construal, it is God’s nature 
which accounts for God’s existence 200. But, Davies notes, Aquinas emphasizes 
that «God is neither made to be by anything nor able to be made by anything. 
And... this is not to hold that the fact of God’s existence is deducible from His 
nature» 201. if the latter thesis were true, then, we could know what the term 
«God» really signifies. ‘God’ would be definable and existence would be part 
195 Ibid., p. 105. (Emphasis is mine.)
196 Ibid., p. 105.
197 Wolterstorff seems to manifest his doubts as he confesses that «articulating the concept of 
account/explanation/cause that is operative here is a challenging intellectual task» (Wolter-
storFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 105). 
198 S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 4.
199 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 105. (Emphasis is mine). That it was a uniform 
conviction among medievals is again debatable.
200 David Burrell also notes the same misinterpretation by Robert Adams in AdAMs, r., «Divine 
Necessity» in The Virtue of Faith (cfr. Burrell, d., «Simpleness», in dAvies, B., oP (ed.), Phi-
losophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject, Cassell, London, 1998, p. 74).
201 dAvies, B., oP, «Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 64. Davies notes 
that the thesis that God’s existence is deducible from His essence is a positive one while Aquinas’ 
claim is negative. 
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of God’s definition 202. Herbert McCabe expresses Aquinas’ position saying 
«When we speak of God, although we know how to use our words, there is 
an important sense in which we do not know what they mean. Fundamentally 
this is because of our special ignorance of God. We know how to talk about 
shoes and ships because of our understanding of shoes and ships. We know 
how to talk about God, not because of any understanding of God, but because 
of what we know about creatures» 203.
Another reason for the improbability of Wolterstorff’s construal to be 
held by Aquinas and the medievals is that it logically leads to the absurd con-
cept of God as causa sui, which Aquinas rejects. For God’s essence to account 
for His existence is utterly contradictory 204. The principal difficulty of a rela-
tional ontologist in accepting the second theistic identity claim resides in the 
concept of existence as an abstract property that exists separately. Wolterstorff 
notes, «isn’t God existence an accident, or an accident-like entity? if so, how 
can it possibly be identical with God’s nature?» 205 But predicating existence to 
God is still an open-ended question.
3.1.3. God is identical with His Properties
After demonstrating the distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties (9’s being an odd number and having been mentioned by me, respec-
tively), Wolterstorff claims that with regards to these properties, «there is 
also nothing especially problematic in the third identity claim, that none of 
God’s properties is distinct from God’s nature» 206, for within the constituent 
approach, intrinsic properties are the only ones conceded as real.
However, two important affirmations deserve some attention. Curiously 
enough, Wolterstorff holds that after distinguishing the two ontological 
styles, «the twentieth-century ontologist actually has no difficulty at all with 
202 But Aquinas denies that God can be defined because He does not belong to any genus or species 
(cfr. S. Th. i, 3, 5). 
203 MccABe, H. «Signifying imperfectly», in MccABe, H., oP (trans.), Summa Theologiae, Black-
friars Edition, vol. 3, Appendix 3, London and New York, 1964, p. 104 cited by dAvies, B., oP, 
«Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity», p. 64.
204 if God is causa sui, then, He must not be (in order to be caused) and must be (in order to cause) at 
the same time, which is total absurdity.
205 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 104.
206 Ibid., p. 106.
Russell Alivio BAntiles
84 CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiÁSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 23 / 2013
the doctrine of divine simplicity» 207 for it «fits even more smoothly into the 
contemporary style of ontology than into the medieval. in the medieval style, 
simplicity is a limiting case – albeit, an intelligible one. in the contemporary 
style, simplicity is the general case» 208.
in the relation ontology, simplicity is the general case because it views 
entities as devoid of any ontological structures or compositions. Yet, if this is 
right, then, why would Wolterstorff deny that God is absolutely simple? isn’t 
it paradoxical to think that an ontological style (relation) which views reality 
to be simple and unstructured would deny that God, the Ultimate Cause of 
reality, cannot be simple? isn’t it equally paradoxical to think that an ontolo-
gical style (constituent) which views reality as constituted would have to deny 
constitution in order to uphold absolute divine simplicity? is the coherence of 
divine simplicity just a question of ontological style? i have my doubts.
Another interesting claim concerns what Wolterstorff thinks as the locus of 
engagement with the simplicity doctrine. He may have questioned the doctrine’s 
internal coherence but he does not consider it as the place to engage the me-
dieval thinkers with. The question on whether or not God has a nature, he says, 
is a matter of «fundamental conflict of intuitions» 209. Wolterstorff argues that 
what really perplexed the medieval thinkers were two-fold: (a) the coherence 
of simplicity doctrine with other Christian fundamental doctrines, and (b) the 
possibility of a theory that allows multiple predications about God 210. He says,
i suggest that if we grant them their ontological style, the constituent style, 
then the place to engage them is not on the theistic identity claims as such. 
Those prove to be non-problematic. The place to engage them, in the first 
place, is on the tenability in general of constituent ontology. The place to 
engage them, in the second place, is on the general question of whether it 
is possible, while holding that God is simple, to develop a theory of predi-
cation that adequately accounts for the multiplicity of distinct things Chris-
tians wish to say about God. And the place to engage them, thirdly, is in 
their attempt to show that the doctrine of simplicity does not contradict 
other fundamental doctrines 211.
207 Ibid., p. 108.
208 Ibid., p. 108.
209 Ibid., p. 109.
210 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 109.
211 WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 110.
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Later, we shall have a word on the general tenability of Wolterstorff’s 
analysis. With regards to the possibility of a theory of predication according 
to his specifications, the question shall be dealt with in the succeeding chapter. 
For the meantime, we shall take up the question on whether the simplicity 
doctrine contradicts or not other fundamental Christian doctrines like God’s 
knowledge, free will and redemption.
3.2. Divine Simplicity, Immutability and Impassibility
Wolterstorff laments over the vagueness with which Aquinas presents 
how the simplicity doctrine is coherent with the biblical doctrines 212, in par-
ticular, with claims on God’s knowledge, love, creative act, revealing and re-
deeming 213. But i believe proper understanding of Thomistic views would re-
veal that the contrary is true.
3.2.1. Whether God Knows Suffering and Evil in the World
in his article Suffering Love 214, Wolterstorff engages with the Thomistic 
tenet which holds that by their very nature, sorrow and pain cannot be found 
in God 215. He argues that if God cannot suffer, then, He is either ignorant 
of or indifferent to the suffering and evil that transpire in the life of human 
creatures. But this is incompatible with the biblical doctrines on God’s omnis-
cience and love. The Bible presents God as «disturbed by the sufferings we 
human beings undergo and the wrongs we wreak upon each other – and by 
the way we treat God» 216.
212 «Aquinas struggled to show that the doctrine of divine simplicity is not in contradiction with 
other doctrines that he felt required to affirm» (WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», 
p. 93).
213 «We shall want to ask whether what they (the medievals) identify as knowledge, love, creation, 
revelation, redemption, etc., in the simple self-sufficient God, can be viewed as what the theist 
is speaking of when she says that God knows and loves, that God has created, that God reveals 
to human beings God’s will, and that God is working for the redemption of the cosmos. i have 
my doubts» (WolterstorFF, n., «Divine Simplicity», p. 111).
214 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», in Inquiring About God, pp. 182-222. 
215 Cfr. ScG, i, 89, 9. «in every passion of the appetite the patient is somehow drawn out of his 
usual, calm, or connatural disposition... But it is not possible for God to be somehow drawn 
outside His natural condition, since He is absolutely immutable» (ScG, i, 89, 4).
216 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed by what transpires in human affairs», in Wolter-
storFF, n., Inquiring About God, p. 223.
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in his analysis of Aquinas’ theory on divine knowledge, will and love, 
Wolterstorff concludes that «Aquinas does not find, in the Plotinian God, 
anything that could appropriately be called knowing the suffering and evil that 
transpire in our world» 217. on Aquinas’ theory, since the primary and essential 
object of divine knowledge, will and love is the divine self, what God knows, 
wills and loves, is no other than God’s Essence. Wolterstorff notes: «God 
knows Godself, and God is the cause of all things other than Godself: this 
pair of phenomena is what Aquinas calls ‘God’s knowing of things other than 
Godself’, on the principle that to know the cause of a thing is to know the 
thing. And consider: God wills God’s perfection, and the ensemble of things 
other than God enhances God’s perfection by resembling God: this pair of 
phenomena Aquinas calls God’s willing of things other than Godself. He further-
more proposes calling this last pair of phenomena, God’s loving of things other 
than Godself, on the grounds that one only wills what one regards as good, and 
that to love something is to will its good» 218. Then, he concludes, God does 
not have an awareness of the world at all. if this is true, then God does not 
sufferingly know the world.
What induces Wolterstorff to draw so hastily such a conclusion is so-
mething vague, for Aquinas’ claim is quite clear: «God knows Himself as 
primarily and essentially known, whereas He knows other things as seen in 
His essence» 219. Besides, Wolterstorff is well aware of Aquinas’ arguments on 
God’s having proper knowledge of all things in their distinction from each 
other 220. But to conclude from this that God knows only His Godself is quite 
precipitated 221.
Wolterstorff argues further that if, in knowing God’s essence, God knows 
the multiple ways other things that resemble it, then, by virtue of the simpli-
city doctrine, the object of God’s knowledge must be single and identical with 
His essence. «The demands of the simplicity doctrine are such that he (Aqui-
nas) must say that God’s knowing of God’s essence just is God’s knowing of the 
217 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 215.
218 Ibid., p. 212.
219 ScG, i, 49, 5. 
220 Cfr. ScG, i, 50, 1-11.
221 Wolterstorff, in fact, says, «What is missing throughout is any awareness of, any acquaintance 
with things other than Godself by God. God has no concept nor anything like a concept of 
anything other than Godself» (WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 210).
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various ways in which God can be resembled... But if that is indeed true, then 
what must be said is that the doctrine of divine simplicity requires not only 
that God’s knowing is single but also that what God knows is single» 222. Ultima-
tely, God knows nothing more than His own Godself. «The conclusion must 
be that Aquinas’ adherence to the simplicity doctrine makes untenable this 
attempt at explaining how God knows things other than Godself» 223.
However, Wolterstorff’s interpretation seems too simplistic. Aquinas’ 
point of departure is the existence of and the real distinction between God 
and things other than God 224. Explaining how God knows both in Summa 
Theologiae, Aquinas makes this point clear: «we say that God sees Himself in 
Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other 
things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the 
similitude of things other than Himself» 225. Aquinas argues that «God knows 
things not by receiving anything from them, but, rather, by exercising His 
causality on them» 226. Considering both assumptions, on what ground can it 
be concluded that a single divine act of knowing identical with God’s essence 
must entail a single object of knowledge also identical with divine essence, or 
that since God’s act of knowing is single, what God knows must also be single? 
For in as much as one single cause can have many effects, so is God’s one act 
of knowing can have multiple objects. And to say that these objects are known 
through God’s essence is not contradictory.
Wolterstorff argues that «Aquinas’ struggle to find in the Plotinian 
God something that might appropriately be called ‘knowledge of other 
things’ becomes even more transparently a struggle when it comes to God’s 
knowledge of evil» 227. For Aquinas, «when the good is known, the opposite 
evil is known. But God knows all particular goods, to which evils are oppo-
222 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 214. However, it must be noted that, strictly speak-
ing, God has no ideas, since to have ideas, being a creatural mode of knowing, is improper of God: 
it is a defective and insufficient form of knowing. Thus, in talking about ideas in God, or objects 
of God’s knowledge, we must consider them, not in their respective distinctions, but in being 
God’s Essence itself. 
223 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 214.
224 Aquinas cites Dionysius saying «the divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows other things», and 
Psalm 110: 20: «He hath looked forth from His high sanctuary», which, for Aquinas, means 
«that God sees other things from His own height» (cfr. ScG, i, 49, 6, 7).
225 S. Th. i, q. 14, a. 5.
226 ScG, i, 70, 2.
227 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 214.
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sed. Therefore God knows evils» 228. Wolterstorff interprets this to mean that 
God, in knowing a particular good, say a person of good sight, also knows 
what blindness is. But what is baffling is Wolterstorff’s ruling: «anyone who 
has such knowledge... That leaves such a person well short of knowing, say, 
that some particular elderly woman has gone blind – which is what all of us 
would regard as knowing one of the actual evils of our world» 229. Meaning 
to say, to know abstract evil (blindness) only as something opposite to con-
crete, particular good (a person of good sight) cannot be appropriately called 
«knowledge of evil». But what makes Wolterstorff think that, for Aquinas, 
God’s knowledge of evil is limited only to abstract evil and that God does 
not know some particular blind woman? What is true, i submit, is that in 
saying, «when the good is known, the opposite evil is known», Aquinas is 
thinking of evil not as a subsisting entity in itself, but something that is 
corollary to the concept of good. in Aquinas’ account, an absolutely simple 
God knows suffering and evil in the world but the evil of sorrow and pain is 
not present in God.
3.2.2. Whether God’s Love is a Suffering Love
Wolterstorff argues that adopting the Plotinian concept of an impassible 
God pays the price of surrendering the Christian belief in a knowing and lo-
ving biblical God and to do this «is to move away from Christianity toward 
some other form of religion» 230. He alleges that the divine simplicity tradition 
presents a God who loves the world, «only in the mode of benevolence; it 
proposed construing all the biblical passages in the light of that conviction» 231. 
He rejects the idea of a benevolent, Stoic divine love and insinuates that true 
love of God consists in the modern notion of love in the mode of sympathy. 
He says, «The moderns paint in attractive colors a moral ideal that is an alter-
native to that of the tradition, and point to various biblical passages speaking 
228 S. Th. i, q. 71, a. 2.
229 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 215.
230 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 215. Whether or not Wolterstorff identifies the Plo-
tinian concept of God with Aquinas’ simple God is not quite clear. But he takes the former as a 
great influence to the latter. 
231 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 215. it must be noted that Wolterstorff understands 
«benevolence» as a «steady disposition to do good to God’s creatures» (p. 216) and takes it as 
something opposed to love as sympathy.
CUADERNoS DoCToRALES DE LA FACULTAD ECLESiÁSTiCA DE FiLoSoFíA / voL. 23 / 2013 89
God, faith and reason in the PhilosoPhy of nicholas Wolterstorff
of God’s suffering love – passages that the tradition, for centuries, has cons-
trued in its own way» 232.
To love with sympathy is to delight in the joy and to pain over the su-
ffering of the beloved. But the Plotinian God delights only in His own well-
doing and is not perturbed by the evil in his creation. «For no matter what the 
state of the world, there is room for God’s successful exercise of God’s steady 
disposition to do good; and it is in that exercise that God finds delight» 233. or 
else, God’s state of joy or sadness would be conditioned by things other than 
Godself. This God acts out of duty and values nothing but His own good 
will 234.
But aside from the conflict with the Scriptural tradition that this picture 
provokes 235, Wolterstorff notes that «To construe God’s love as purely bene-
volence and to construe God’s benevolence along Kantian-Stoic lines as God’s 
acting out of duty, is to be left without God’s love» 236. He, then, suggests that 
we reject this duty-model of God’s love and embrace another model in which 
positive and negative valuing exists. «To act out of love toward something 
other than oneself is to value that thing and certain states of that thing» 237.
Wolterstorff’s argument echoes a famous objection against divine impas-
sibility: «how can God be Love and not pained (as human love at its best is 
pained) by evil?» 238 How can we conceive of divine love without sympathy? 
Besides, if God fully became man, how can we say that He did not experience 
any pain that His manhood entails? 239
Analyzing Wolterstorff’s argument requires a careful distinction between 
love and sympathy and a thorough understanding of what it means to sorrow 
232 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 216.
233 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 216.
234 Wolterstorff notes, «if we interpret God’s benevolence as God’s acting out of duty, then the 
traditional picture becomes coherent» (WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 218).
235 Wolterstorff notes that «The picture of God as a Stoic sage, ever blissful and non-suffering, is 
in deep conflict with the biblical picture» (WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 219).
236 WolterstorFF, n., «Suffering Love», p. 218.
237 Ibid., p. 218.
238 oWen, H. P., Concepts of Deity, MacMillan, London, 1971, p. 24.
239 Although this last objection based on incarnation is not fully developed in Wolterstorff, his po-
sition is clear: in Jesus, God suffers. it must be clarified, however, that by virtue of communication 
idiomatum, to affirm that God suffers is valid inasmuch as it holds that it is the Second Divine 
Person Who is incarnated, and that divine and human natures are essentially united –with dis-
tinction but without separation– in the one Divine Person of Christ. But if it suggests that the 
divinity suffers, then the affirmation is invalid. 
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over evil. it must be noted that love cannot be reduced to mere sympathy, un-
derstood in this context as to delight over the good or to pain over the evil of 
the beloved. Sympathy, in this sense, is an affection that is founded on love. As 
Aquinas says, «the principle of every affection is love. For joy and desire are 
only of a good that is loved, and fear and sadness are only of an evil that is op-
posed to the good that is loved; and from all these all the other affections take 
their origin. But in God there is joy and delight» 240. Hence, contra Wolters-
torff, we must say that God’s love takes also the mode of sympathy, although 
it is not irreducible to it.
Wolterstorff admits that God takes joy (sympathizes) in His creatures, 
but limits such delight only in the exercise of God’s benevolence or firm dis-
position to do good 241. What Wolterstorff somehow missed in the picture is 
that, in Aquinas, God’s benevolence is creative because divine will is creative 242. 
The good that God wills, He creates.
God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, 
are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good... God’s will is the 
cause of all things. it must need be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or 
any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing 
thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing 
else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything 
that exists 243.
on this perspective, Wolterstorff’s picture of a Stoic, benevolently loving 
God is modified. He is not a Stoic God Who delights solely on a dutiful exercise 
of His benevolent love without valuing the condition of His creatures. Rather, 
He is a God, Who, in His benevolent love, causes the existence of His creatures. 
And because God cares for the plight of His creatures, He wills (creates) their 
good and delights in it, while He sorrows for their evil and dispels it.
in the same vein, Aquinas explains God’s mercy. «Mercy is especially to 
be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. 
240 ScG, i, 91, 7.
241 Aquinas defines benevolent love as «to will the good of the beloved» (ScG, i, 91, 2).
242 S. Th. i, q. 19, a. 4. 
243 S. Th. i, q. 20, a. 2. He also says, «Certain philosophers likewise made God’s love to be the 
principle of things. With this view the words of Dionysius agree when he says that «the divine 
love did not allow Him to be without offspring» (ScG, i, 91, 14).
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in proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful 
(misericors), as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart (miserum cor); being affec-
ted with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it 
follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; 
and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others 
belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that 
misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name» 244. Hence, God’s bene-
volent love, in Aquinas’ account, is not a Stoic love.
Wolterstorff’s description of benevolent love fits better in what Aquinas 
calls our human way of loving. When we love, as Wolterstorff says, we value 
or sympathize in the condition of the beloved, whether positively or negatively. 
But our valuing or sympathizing takes place because the goodness of the object 
(or the lack of it), says Aquinas, «calls forth our love», and we desire that the 
good it has be preserved and receive besides the good it has not 245. When God 
loves benevolently, He also values the condition of the beloved. But God’s 
valuing or sympathizing does more, as it causes the thing to exist. Hence, God’s 
valuing is an act of loving par excellence because it is a creative.
Does God love in the mode of sympathy, i.e., is it a suffering love? Hu-
man «sympathy» (from the Greek syn- «together» and pathos «feeling»), sim-
ply means affinity of feelings, being affected by like feelings 246. Suffering or sym-
pathetic love, then, means to be affected by the same suffering of the beloved 
as if it were one’s own. But God’s suffering love needs not be ontologically 
identical. Divine «sympathy» cannot be limited only in an affinity of feelings. 
Since it is creative, it consists in a participation of being, because God, in crea-
ting things, shares His Being. When God sympathizes, He lets creatures par-
ticipate in His own Being.
244 S. Th. i, q. 21, a. 3. in citing this passage, Wolterstorff interprets Aquinas as turning God’s 
mercy into «mere benevolence». What i am arguing is that, in God, mercy and benevolence 
means the same. only human mercy must be understood as miserum cor because God cannot 
have passions.
245 «Since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our 
love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its good-
ness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve 
the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: 
whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness» (S. Th. i, q. 20, a. 2).
246 online etyMoloGy dictionAry, «Sympathy», <http://www.etymonline.com /index.
php?term=sympathy> [Last consulted: November 4, 2011].
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in the same way that when God creates, His creative act does not suppose 
any change or modification in His Being, when He «sympathizes» or «loves 
benevolently», God is not affected or altered in His Essence. To be affec-
ted is to endure some passion, which takes place «only according to sensitive 
appetite» 247. But no sensitive appetite can be found in God for it is absurd to 
attribute to Him any sensitive knowledge 248. Hence, God loves sufferingly but 
remains immutable.
However, divine immutability does not imply that God is Stoic. That no 
passion can be attributed to God in the same sense that it is attributed to crea-
tures simply means that God is Absolutely Perfect. Besides, while to suffer or 
to sorrow is not in Him properly speaking, it is proper to Him to dispel suffering 
and sorrow. owen says the sorrow and pain in God are wholly vicarious and 
that any suffering that God experiences through His love for His creatures «is 
immediately transfigured by the joy that is necessarily His within his uncrea-
ted Godhead» 249. Let us now examine what it means for an immutable God to 
sorrow over evil as an expression of His suffering love.
3.2.3. Whether Evil is Present in a God Who sorrows
in another article, Is God disturbed by what transpires in human affairs? 250, 
Wolterstorff argues for some alleged incongruence in Aquinas’ position that 
it is inappropriate for God to sorrow. But his argument that «Aquinas’ way 
of developing the claim that God does not experience anger implies that God 
cannot be wronged» 251 is quite hasty. Aquinas distinguishes clearly love, joy and 
delight as passions, or acts of the sensitive appetite from love, joy and delight as acts 
of the intellective appetite 252. He attributes only the latter to God for the simple 
reason that the former denotes some material element; thus, introducing com-
247 ScG, i, 89, 2. Aquinas also cites Aristotle’s Physics, vii, 3 (246b 20).
248 ScG, i, 44.
249 owen takes divine suffering as God’s «imaginative response to the sin and suffering that afflict 
his creatures» (oWen, H. P., Concepts of Deity, p. 24).
250 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», pp. 223-238. 
251 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 224.
252 «Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective 
appetite, they are not passions. it is in this latter sense that they are in God» (S. Th. i, q. 20, a, 
1, ad 1). For Aquinas, passions are «movements of the sensitive appetite» (S. Th. i-ii, q. 23, a, 1, 
sed contra). He identifies the intellective appetite with the will (cfr. S. Th. i, q.82, a. 2, obj. 3). 
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position in the divine essence 253. on the other hand, sorrow, anger and desire, 
by nature, are passions that not only entail material element or bodily change 
but also imperfections as to their formal element 254. For this reason, they cannot 
«be properly predicated of God... except metaphorically, and from likeness of 
effects» 255. Besides, absolute divine perfection necessarily entails that sorrow 
and anger cannot be present in God because sorrow is «caused by a present 
evil... (which is) repugnant to the movement of the will» 256 and «being uneasy 
about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the ap-
petite in good» 257. But both are unthinkable in an absolutely perfect being 258.
However, Aquinas concedes that to sorrow is good inasmuch as it is «on 
the supposition of something else». He says, «supposing the presence of so-
mething saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or 
pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, 
this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon 
it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently 
it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or 
pain should ensue» 259.
Now, Aquinas claims that God knows evil and that it is impossible for 
Him not to reckon it as evil, as it would manifest a defect in God. Wolterstorff 
asks, «So how can Aquinas hold that there is nothing over which it is appro-
priate for God to sorrow, given his contention that it is an imperfection not 
to sorrow over the evils present to one?» 260. in this question, we may distin-
253 «in the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element-
-namely, the bodily change--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite» 
(S. Th. i, q. 20, a, 1, ad 2).
254 «Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15, 63, 64), the material element is the 
kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards 
the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of 
the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, 
which supposes sorrow» (S. Th. i, q. 20, a, 1, ad 2).
255 S. Th. i, q. 20, a, 1, resp. 2; «Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude 
of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God’s punishment is 
metaphorically spoken of as His anger» (S. Th. i, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2); cfr. also S. Th. i, q. 19, a. 11). 
256 S. Th. i-ii, q. 37, a. 2, ad.
257 S. Th. i-ii, q. 39, a. 1, ad.
258 Juan Miguel Garrigues notes that «Si Dios no concibe el mal, no es que haya algo que escape a 
su visión» (GArriGues, J. M., Dios sin idea del mal, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2000, p. 189).
259 S. Th. i-ii, q. 39, a. 1, ad.
260 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 229.
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guish «to sorrow over evil» from the «presence of sorrow» (which, in itself, 
is evil) in God. Wolterstorff holds that since God sorrows over evil, sorrow is 
present in God. Now, the incapacity to sorrow over evil entails the presence of 
evil itself for it denotes a defect. But if this is true, why would the capacity to 
sorrow over evil also necessarily entail the presence of evil? Two points require 
elucidation to clarify this question.
First, i think it is crucial here Aquinas’ distinction between two ways by 
which a thing may be good or evil, i.e., considered «simply and in itself» and 
considered «on the supposition of something else» 261. on such distinction, 
sorrow in itself implies an imperfection and the presence of evil that is repug-
nant to the will; hence, it cannot be found in God as it would entail contradic-
tion in His Essence. But sorrow on account of something else can be a sign of 
excellence; therefore, it is attributable to God. Wolterstorff’s claim that God 
is disturbed by what transpires in human affairs, i think, goes along this vein.
The distinction allows us to see how God, without being affected by 
sorrow (in the sense of sorrow being present in God), could still sorrow over 
human suffering and evil. Naturally, in human beings, it is not difficult to 
identify these two senses of sorrow. We are affected by sorrow, for unlike in 
God, the presence of evil that is repugnant to our good will, hinders us from 
enjoying the good we desire. And this implies imperfection; hence, evil is pre-
sent in man. Like God, we sorrow over suffering and evil around us. And this 
is also virtuous. But unlike God, we are affected by them. That is why, for us, 
to sorrow over evil means that sorrow (which, in itself, is evil) is present in us. 
But on what ground it has to be exactly like this with God? Wolterstorff holds 
that «since God loves human beings, since empathy is an important part of 
love, since there is suffering among human beings, and since empathy with the 
suffering is itself a mode of suffering, God must suffer» 262. But we can raise 
the question: why should human and divine empathy be identical? on what 
ground should God identically empathize the way we do? Why should God 
sufferingly love exactly the way we do?
261 «A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all 
sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is 
itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said 
to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the 
supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9» (S. Th. i-ii, q. 39, a. 1, ad).
262 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 224. 
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Second, that God sorrows over the presence of evil does not necessarily 
entail that evil is present in God. As Aquinas notes, «Evil is known by God 
not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has 
no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an ‘exemplar’ nor as a ‘type’» 263. 
God knows evil, not as something subsisting in itself (substantial) but as the 
privation of some good 264. For this reason, God, in knowing evil, does not and 
cannot create it, in the same way God, in desiring good for His creatures, crea-
tes that good. Garrigues states it clearly: «Dios no puede concebir el mal, porque 
todo cuanto Dios concibe, lo crea: el ser, el bien, la vida. Las ‘ideas’ de Dios son la ma-
nera en que sus criaturas participan de sus perfecciones. El mal no es, y Dios no puede 
conocerlo en una idea. Nada en Él corresponde al mal» 265. Hence, the presence of 
evil over which God sorrows, then, is not substantial.
Now, if to sorrow or pain over suffering and evil is, as Aquinas claims, 
«a sign of goodness» 266, and if «to sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes 
perception and rejection of evil» 267, and, lastly, if it is proper to God to dispel 
suffering rather than to be affected by it, then, the more logical conclusion we 
can draw is that God, the Highest Good, can and does sorrow and pain over 
suffering and evil and that His sorrow is a good –i would say, an excellent vir-
tue– for not only does He perceive and reckon suffering and evil, but also He 
eliminates them. if to sorrow over evil is a good, then, God sorrows over evil 
because He is the Highest Good, but without the evil of sorrow being subs-
tantially present in Him. on what ground, then, would Wolterstorff conclude 
that «if there is no sorrow in God, no anger, indignation, and the like, then 
there is for God no ‘present evil’, nothing to sorrow over» 268? As we have seen, 
263 S. Th. i, q. 15, a. 3, ad 1. 
264 «in this universe even that which is called evil, well ordered, and kept in its place, sets the good 
in higher relief, so that good things are more pleasing and praiseworthy than evil ones. Nor 
would Almighty God... in any way allow anything evil to exist among His works were He not 
so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what else is that which 
is called evil but a removal of good?» (AuGustine, The Augustine Catechism: The Enchiridion on 
Faith, Hope and Charity, rAMsey, B., oP (ed.), New City Press, New York, 2000, p. 41). This is 
why, to conceive substantially of evil as an entity, which i suspect is how Wolterstorff presents 
it, is misleading.
265 GArriGues, J. M., Dios sin idea del mal, p. 190.
266 S. Th. i-ii, q. 39, a. 1, ad.
267 Aquinas even argues that «in so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good» because, in the 
case of interior sorrow, its perception is a sign of the «right judgment of reason» and its rejec-
tion by the will shows the latter good disposition to detest evil (cfr. S. Th. i-ii, q. 39, a. 2, ad).
268 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 229.
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God has something to sorrow over (the evil present in the world). But this is 
not something that affects God (evil cannot be present in God) for God’s so-
rrowing over it is, in itself, an excellent virtue, not evil in itself 269. Wolterstorff 
seems to confuse evil present in the world (which God sorrows over) with evil 
present in God (which He cannot sorrow over for it entails a contradiction).
Another argument shows how Wolterstorff identifies sorrow in God with 
God’s sorrowing over an evil that goes against God’s will – in this case, the evil 
of sin. He says,
Accordingly, if something is out of accord with God’s will, then perforce it is 
out of accord with God’s intellective appetite. And sin... is out of accord with 
God’s will. But given the earlier account of sorrow, if things happen that are 
out of accord with God’s intellective appetite, then there is sorrow in God. 
if follows, so it would seem, that there is sorrow in God 270.
Wolterstorff argues that since sin, although in itself, is not actively willed 
by God but is permitted only in view of a greater good, entails opposition to 
God’s will and since sorrow entails the presence of evil which is repugnant 
to the movement of the will for it hinders it from enjoying what is wishes to 
enjoy, then, there is sorrow in God. However, employing the Thomistic dis-
tinction above, it could be argued that the presence of the evil of sin is repug-
nant to God’s will, not when it is considered simply and in itself, for no evil can 
hinder God from enjoying the eternal bliss He is enjoying. it is unthinkable 
of God not to be happy for a moment, and of God’s will to wish or to desire 
to be happy. in contrast, for the sinner, sin is repugnant simply and in itself 
because it hinders the will from enjoying perfect happiness. it corrupts the 
will. if «No man willingly does wrong» 271, as Plato says, then, falling into sin 
implies corruption in the will. But sin cannot and does not corrupt the divine 
will. Hence, sin, as a moral evil, is repugnant to God’s will, not when it is con-
sidered simply and in itself.
269 on the contrary, man’s sorrowing over the presence of evil is an evil in itself because to sorrow 
for human beings, as Aquinas puts it, implies an «imperfection». Hence, when we sorrow over 
evil, our doing so already implies the presence of evil in us – the evil of sorrow.
270 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 231.
271 Norman Gulley examines thoroughly the meaning of Plato’s famous words in Gulley, n., 
«The interpretation of ‘No one Does Wrong Willingly’ in Plato’s Dialogues», in Phronesis, vol. 
10, no. 1 (1965), pp. 82-96.
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Sin is repugnant to God’s will only on the supposition that it is noxious to 
the sinner. God hates sin only because He loves the sinner. Take away that 
love, such hatred or repugnance of sin to God’s will is devoid of meaning. 
Hence, if sin is repugnant to God’s intellective appetite on account of the sin-
ner, then, sorrow is not in God but God can, and, in fact, does sorrow over sin 
and its noxious effect on the sinner. i think the same conclusion is arrived at 
even if we employ, as Wolterstorff does, Aquinas’ distinction between antece-
dent and consequent will, although Wolterstorff says «it is of no help in explai-
ning and defending Aquinas’ claim that God does not sorrow over sin – nor, 
let us note, does Aquinas himself employ it for that purpose» 272.
For Aquinas, «God’s consequent will is always fulfilled, while what 
He wills antecedently may not take place» 273. With this, Wolterstorff takes 
Aquinas to claim that sin is out of accord with God’s antecedent will, not 
with the consequent, «and that only if something were out of accord with 
God’s consequent will would it be appropriate for God to sorrow over 
it» 274. He also holds that such distinction between antecedent and conse-
quent will «is obviously a straightforward counterpart to the distinction... 
between something’s being evil considered as such and something’s being 
evil all things considered» 275. Wolterstorff may be right in demonstrating 
that, in reality, it is Aquinas’ view that sin is opposed to both the antecedent 
and consequent will of God. But it makes no difference now since we have 
concluded that, indeed, in Aquinas, God sorrows over sin, contrary to what 
Wolterstorff supposes. But this does not entail sorrow in God. Besides, let it 
be noted that when we talk of God’s antecedent and consequent will, we do 
not mean two separate wills in God. We only distinguish them with respect 
to us, temporal creatures. But with respect to an eternal God, there is only 
one divine will 276.
Based on the preceding considerations, we have established, contra Wol-
terstorff that, in Aquinas’ position, (a) God knows the suffering and evil in the 
world. But such knowledge is not of suffering and evil as substantially existing 
272 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 232.
273 S. Th. i, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.
274 WolterstorFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 232.
275 Ibidem.
276 Probably, Wolterstorff would not be quite happy with this distinction on account of his position 
on divine eternity, which shall be discussed later.
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entities since evil is a corollary concept of the good. As a parasitic concept, 
evil is the privation of good. God knows all the particular good through His 
knowledge of His own Essence; (b) God loves His creatures with a benevolent 
but creative love. He creates the good He desires for His beloved. God’s love 
is suffering in the sense that He dispels the cause of suffering of the beloved. 
in sufferingly loving His creatures, no change takes place in God; (c) God so-
rrows over the present evil in the world. But this does not necessarily entail 
that evil is present in God.
Having established these, it is now difficult to see how the divine sim-
plicity doctrine becomes incompatible with the biblical teachings on God’s 
knowledge, love and redemption. Contrary to Wolterstorff’s claim, the whole 
history of man’s salvation makes sense more profoundly only under the light 
of the simplicity doctrine 277. God knows the evil which man suffers –the evil of 
sin– but such knowledge does not necessarily make evil to be present in God. 
God sorrows over sin and its effects on man but without the need of being 
affected by it. in His suffering, benevolent love, «God so loved the world that 
He gave us His only Son» in order to dispel the cause of our suffering (Jn 3: 
16, RSV) 278. The reasonability of faith requires that, in predicating to God His 
acts of knowing, loving and redeeming mankind, God remain to be absolutely 
one and simple. or else, He would not be God.
Wolterstorff’s another attempt to discredit the divine simplicity doc-
trine centers on the argument that if God is simple, then, He must be 
eternal. Arguing that the Bible presents God as temporal, he goes on to 
claim that God is not eternal but everlasting. What follows is an analysis of 
Wolterstorff’s preferred account of temporality and of the defensibility of 
his arguments.
3.3. Divine Eternity, Awareness and Action
in a compilation of essays that tackle the question on God and time, Gre-
gory E. Ganssle enumerates five important issues, each of which is discussed 
277 Wolterstorff argues: «Scripture presents God not only as disturbed by evil but also as the savior 
of humankind from evil; Christianity is a salvation religion. if there were nothing in human 
affairs that God desired to be otherwise, talk of salvation would make no sense» (Wolter-
storFF, n., «is God disturbed...», p. 236).
278 Biblical citations are from the cAtHolic BiBlicAl AssociAtion oF GreAt BritAin, The Holy 
Bible: Revised Standard Version, Catholic Truth Society, London, 1966.
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by each philosopher-contributor 279. They are «the nature of time, the creation 
of the universe, God’s knowledge of the future, God’s interaction with His 
people and the fullness of God’s life» 280. in one way or another, each issue will 
be touched in what follows.
3.3.1. Bible and the Nature of Time
•  on Biblical orthodoxy
Wolterstorff believes that authentic commitment to biblical orthodoxy 
is best maintained if we affirm that God is temporal rather than timeless 281. 
He says that by presenting God as an active agent in human history, the Bible 
describes Him to be historical and changing.
God responds to what transpires in human affairs by performing a succes-
sion of actions, including actions of speaking... if a person does one thing 
at one time and a different thing at a later time, then there’s change in 
that person’s life. Behind the change in action there is, in turn, a change 
in knowledge... God has a history, and in this history there are changes in 
God’s actions, responses, and knowledge. The God of Scripture is one of 
whom a narrative can be told... if something has a history, then perforce that 
being is in time 282.
As a hermeneutic principle, Wolterstorff establishes that if we accept the 
canonicity of the Sacred Scripture, then, we should «affirm as literally true 
279 The book highlights four views on God and time by four distinguished contemporary thinkers 
–Paul Helm, Alan G. Padgett, William Lane Craig and Nicholas Wolterstorff– who, Ganssle 
says, «are some of the leading thinkers» of the subject (GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time: 
Four Views, intervarsity Press, Downers Grove, illinois, 2001, p. 24). in Wolterstorff’s essays, 
he answers some recent objections to his position.
280 For discussion on each issue, see GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time, pp. 13-24.
281 H. P. owen explains that the adjective «eternal» has two senses: «timeless» and «everlasting». 
The latter may be given either a strong form –what is everlasting always has existed and will 
always exist– or a weak form, that is, it has a beginning but no end (like the soul) (cfr. oWen, 
H. P., Concepts of Deity, p. 19). Wolterstorff claims for God’s eternity the second sense in its 
stronger form, that is, that God has no beginning and no end, yet still, within time. He explains 
why a God who acts in history cannot be timeless but everlasting in two articles: (a) Wolter-
storFF, n., «God Everlasting», in WolterstorFF, n., Inquiring About God, pp. 133-156, and 
(b) WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», in WolterstorFF, n., Inquiring 
About God, pp. 157-181. 
282 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 158. 
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Scripture’s presentation of God unless one has good reason not to do so» 283. it 
is because, generally, in any discourse, the default option is to take the discour-
ser as speaking literally, unless substantial reasons exist that it is otherwise. To 
take the speaker to be speaking not literally is to bear the burden of proof 284. 
Specifically, whatever in the literal interpretation of the Bible that is in con-
flict with what Augustine calls «purity of life or soundness of doctrine», then 
that is a reason good enough for not interpreting it literally 285. Now, when 
this principle stands next to the claim that the Bible presents God as having 
a history, it implies that those who hold that God is timeless bear the burden 
of proof of explaining why we should not accept as literally true this biblical 
presentation of God. Wolterstorff argues: «The massiveness of the tradition 
has not shifted the burden of proof; what it does instead is place on those of 
us who disagree with the theological tradition a weighty obligation... But the 
burden of proof remains on them... otherwise what’s left of the church’s con-
fession that Scripture, for it, is canonical?» 286
Commenting on this principle, Paul Helm says that its application would 
incline one «to be an ontological minimalist in respect of the divine nature», 
since instead of taking God, as the Bible presents Him, to be «ontologically 
immutable» in His very being or nature, we take Him as immutable only in 
His resolve 287. William Lane Craig thinks it naïve to take this hermeneutic 
principle because it is «insensitive to the genre(s) of Scripture» 288. While our 
author simply denies Helm’s contention, he argues that Craig’s criticism «is 
based on a misunderstanding» 289. But i think that whatever this principle may 
283 Ibid., p. 158.
284 Wolterstorff adds that if the literal, metaphorical or ironical meaning of one’s words were some-
thing that is always readily obtainable, «one’s interpretation of one’s fellows could never get off 
the ground» (WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 158). 
285 «Whatever appears in the Divine Word that does not literally pertain to virtuous behavior or to 
the truth of faith you must take to be figurative» (AuGustine, On Christian Doctrine, iii, 10, 14, 
roBertson, d. W., Jr. (trans.), The Bobbs-Merrill Company, inc., New York, 1958, p. 88).
286 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», pp. 159-160.
287 «How would Nick approach the representation of God as being surprised?» (HelM, P., «Re-
sponse to Nicholas Wolterstorff», in GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time..., p. 215). 
288 crAiG, W. l., «Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff», in GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time..., 
p. 222.
289 Wolterstorff holds that texts all by themselves do not have any fixed sense; hence, they don’t 
provide all by themselves either good or bad reasons for taking some sentence literally (cfr. 
WolterstorFF, n., «Response to Critics», in GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time..., pp. 225-
238). This idea will be discussed in Chapter iii.
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come into, it should not suggest that we can read our view on God and time 
directly from the few relevant biblical texts. As Ganssle himself notes, «What 
the Bible will do for us, however, is provide the parameters for any adequate 
understanding of God’s relation to time» 290.
With this hermeneutic tool at hand, Wolterstorff surveys the Sacred 
Scripture to find out any literal passage that tells us about God’s timelessness 
and immutability. He concludes that the closest he could find provides no 
substantial support to the claim 291. instead, it makes clear that God is not a 
passive observer but an active agent in human history. He creates the world 
and sustains it in its existence. God’s intervention culminates in the history of 
redemption upon knowing the misery that befalls His creation when human 
beings decided to stay away from Him. «Aware of what is going on, God has 
resolved, in response to the sin of human beings and the resultant evils, to 
bring about renewal. God has, indeed, already been acting in accord with that 
resolve, centrally and decisively in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ» 292. Wolterstorff holds, then, that God’s temporality can be demons-
trated on two accounts: on God’s action in the world and on God’s knowledge 
of facts. Divine action and omniscience are the backbones of Wolterstorff’s 
argument that God is everlasting. The analysis of these two requires that we 
examine what Wolterstorff takes to be the nature of time 293.
290 GAnssle, G. e. (ed.), God and Time..., p. 11.
291 With regards to divine timelessness, Wolterstorff examines Psalm 90 where the author says 
«from everlasting to everlasting Thou art God» (v. 2); 2 Peter 3:8, «With the Lord one day 
is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day»; and John 8:58, «Before Abraham 
was, i AM». He concludes that the first supports, not divine timelessness but temporality; 
the second shows that there is duration in God; and the third, that Jesus is divine. «if i AM 
existed before Abraham, how could i AM be timeless?» (WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified 
Divine Temporality», pp. 160-161). As to God’s immutability, Wolterstorff analyzes Malachi 
3:6, which says, «i, the Lord, do not change»; Psalm 102, in which one finds «They will per-
ish, but Thou dost endure» (v. 26); and James 1:17, «there is no variation or shadow due to 
change». His diagnosis is that these passages do not support divine immutability but rather 
«the doctrine of God’s unswerving fidelity» if taken in their context (cfr. WolterstorFF, n., 
«God Everlasting», pp. 153-154; WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», 
pp. 161-163). 
292 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 133.
293 A collection of the latest studies of many top thinkers in the field offers a philosophical inquiry 
into the nature of time representing new perspectives and innovative methodologies including 
those that «illustrate the integral relationship between the philosophy of time and the empirical 
sciences» in BArdon, A., The Future of the Philosophy of Time, Routledge Studies in Metaphysics, 
New York, 2012.
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•  on the Nature of Time
Wolterstorff is a self-confessed adherent of what J. M. E. McTaggart calls 
the «A-series» theory of time. McTaggart, in a famous article published in 
1908, denies the reality of time and claims that temporal order is mere appea-
rance. in his argument, he distinguishes two ways in which positions in time 
can be ordered: the A-series and the B-series. He shows how the A-series is 
the essential and the fundamental determinant of time. But its inherent con-
tradiction leads McTaggart to conclude that time is unreal 294.
Accordingly, there are two ways by which we account for the reality of 
time. Events are said to be temporal, either (a) by their possession of the pro-
perties («A properties») of being past, present, or future (it is called «A-series»); 
or (b) by their relation of being earlier, simultaneous, or later («B relations») 
with respect to another event («B-series»). Events, processes, states and the 
like –not particular things– are the primary occupants of temporal positions, 
says Brian Leftow 295. For Wolterstorff, an event «consists in something’s ac-
tually having some property, or something’s actually performing some action, 
or something’s actually standing in some relation to something... They are 
not what can have occurrences. They are, rather, themselves occurrences» 296. 
Now, B-series relations seem to be permanent since an event that is earlier or 
later than another event will always be so. But the A-series essentially involve 
change, for that which is future will become present and what is present will 
eventually become past.
Since it is «universally admitted that time involves change» 297, without 
the A-series, B-series would not constitute time. Yet, the B-series cannot be 
reduced to A-series events, because, as McTaggart claims, there can be «a 
series of permanent relations to one another of those realities which in time 
are events – and it is the combination of this series with the A determinations 
which gives time. But this other series – let us call it the C-series – is not tem-
poral, for it involves no change, but only an order» 298. As to whether A-series 
294 Cfr. MctAGGArt, J.M.e., «The Unreality of Time», in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology 
and Philosophy, 17 (1908), p. 458; cfr. also MctAGGArt, J.M.e., The Nature of Existence, vol. 2, 
BroAd, c. d. (ed.), The University Press, Cambridge, 1927, chapter XXXiii.
295 Cfr. leFtoW, B., Time and Eternity, Cornell University Press, ithaca and London, 2009, p. 18.
296 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 136.
297 MctAGGArt, J.M.e., «The Unreality of Time», p. 459.
298 Ibid., pp. 461-462. 
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can be reduced to B-series temporal propositions is a matter of on-going de-
bate among contemporary thinkers 299.
For the adherents of the A-series view, time is objectively real and not 
just a mere feature of our subjective experience of reality. Even if there were 
no temporal minds, some events would still exemplify the property of occu-
rring now. Hence, the fundamental temporal properties are tensed (it is also 
called the tense theory). Meanwhile, the B-series advocates claim that tem-
poral properties are merely features of our experience of reality and that the 
most fundamental features of time are the relations of «before», «after», and 
«simultaneous with». Hence, A-series propositions can be reduced to B-series 
propositions (it is also known as the tenseless theory).
Given these two different pictures, Wolterstorff opts for the A-series on 
several grounds. Firstly, he holds that «What’s fundamental in time is the occu-
rrence of events – this for the most part having nothing to do with your and my 
temporal relationship to those events» 300. An event cannot have its location 
in the B-series unless it occurs first. its occurrence is what makes the present 
the basic temporal location. What is wrong with the B-series view «is that it 
treats past, present, and future as properties of events and regards these three 
properties as equal in status» 301. Past events have ceased to occur, and in this 
sense, they do not exist anymore. But they «exist» only in the sense that they 
become components of facts that can be referred to. Future events, however, 
cannot be referred to since they have not occurred yet; hence, they do not 
constitute as components of facts 302.
299 McTaggart’s thesis became the locus classicus of the contemporary on-going debate on the nature of 
time. A year after the publication of his article, v. Welby already pointed out what he calls «a flaw 
in the glass through which we habitually observe and consider the whole subject of ‘time’» (WelBy, 
v., «Mr. McTaggart on the ‘Unreality of Time’», in Mind, New Series, 18/70 (April, 1909), p. 326). 
Welby is referring to the «motion-space» perspective of viewing time. Michael Dummet defends 
McTaggart’s proof showing that time is unreal (cfr. duMMet, M., «A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof 
of the Unreality of Time», in The Philosophical Review, 69/4 (october, 1960), pp. 497-504), while 
E. J. Lowe tries to show how McTaggart, despite Dummet’s defense, commits a logical blunder in 
his argument on indexicals (cfr. loWe, e. J., «The indexical Fallacy in McTaggart’s Proof of the 
Unreality of Time», in Mind, New Series, 96/381 (January, 1987), pp. 62-70). Wolterstorff, himself, 
finds McTaggart’s argument on the unreality of time incoherent, while he holds on to the objective 
reality of the A-series (cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 165).
300 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 166.
301 Ibid., p. 166.
302 Wolterstorff, recognizing different views among tense theorists on this point, maintains that 
«only when an event is occurring or has occurred can it be a component of facts and can it be 
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Secondly, Wolterstorff rejects the claim that A-series propositions are 
reducible to B-series terms and indexical strategies. Picking out of some event 
and then specifying the temporal position of all other events in relation to it, 
says our author, is a mere ad hoc strategy. For instance, in the sentence «The 
police arrived after the murderer has escaped», the police’s arrival is past only be-
cause it occurred «after» the murderer’s escape. The universal dating system 
of taking Christ’s birth as reference for all succeeding events is another exam-
ple. Besides, in the use of indexical strategy, Wolterstorff laments over the 
lack of ontological significance given to the distinction between past, present, 
and future 303. Moreover, he also discards as mistaken the identity claim on the 
meaning of statements like «The World Trade Center’s twin towers collapsed 
10 years ago» and «The World Trade Center’s twin towers collapse 10 years 
before 2011». He notes that both sentences have different entailments. The 
former entails nothing of the date of the collapse, the latter entails nothing 
about how long ago 304.
Another difficulty of the tenseless theory, says Wolterstorff, is its inca-
pacity to explain how to bring about something at a certain time, e.g., to turn 
on the radio to hear the one o’clock news 305. one turns the radio when one 
believes that it is now one o’clock. But to have that belief, she needs to deter-
mine which events are occurring now. As Wolterstorff notes, «The tenseless 
theorist, for whom all dates and events have exactly the same ontological sta-
tus, has no way of accounting for how we make that determination» 306. Unless 
one makes use of the A-series, she cannot resolve to turn on the radio at one 
o’clock. Thus, Wolterstorff concludes,
the basic thesis of the tenseless theorist, that tense supervenes on our ope-
ration of the indexical system for specifying temporal location, cannot be 
sustained. Rather than tense supervening on our operation of the system, 
referred to. There are lots of general facts about the future, but no facts having particular events 
as constituents» (WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 166).
303 in saying «The kettle is whistling now», the speaker claims no ontological status about the 
kettle’s whistling, but rather, she is simply relating the whistling to her saying that it is whistling. 
if the «whistling» and the «saying» coincides in time, then the statement is true (cfr. Wolter-
storFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 167).
304 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 168; cfr. also WolterstorFF, 
n., «God Everlasting», pp. 141-145.
305 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 170.
306 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 170.
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we cannot operate the system without being able to pick out those events 
and dates that have the unique ontological status of occurring now. Knowing 
which events occur simultaneously with which (sic) falls short of knowing 
which ones are occurring now 307.
This is a point that McTaggart already makes clear: B-series facts alone 
do not constitute time. However, i think the grounds by which Wolterstorff 
opts the A-series view do not warrant the claim that God is temporal. The A-
series theory even faces more serious objections that Wolterstorff must con-
front if he wants to build his divine temporality account on solid grounds 308.
Besides the alleged contradiction that McTaggart himself has pointed 
out in the A-series view, and against which Wolterstorff argues nothing except 
saying that it is incoherent, Ned Markosian cites at least two most influen-
tial arguments against the A theory 309. one of these is based on the famous 
special theory of relativity in physics, which claims that absolute simultaneity 
does not exist. if this is true, then, no objective facts about A properties, e.g., 
«e is present», exist; hence, the passage of time cannot be objectively real 310. 
Another argument concerns particularly the alleged passage of time. if time 
really passes, then a coherent answer would give sense to the question «How 
fast time passes?» But the rate «one hour per hour» cannot be coherently as-
signed to the passage of time. Thus, it cannot be true, as the A theory claims, 
that time objectively passes.
As we have seen, the contemporary debate on the nature of time is far 
from over. However, Wolterstorff does not pretend to construct an argument 
for the «everlastingness» of God solely on the basis of his choice of the A 
theory of time. instead, the fundamental basis of his claim is the Sacred Scrip-
ture. He says that his reflections on the nature of time is relevant only inas-
307 Ibid., p. 171.
308 The open debate on whether or not tensed facts are ineliminable or reducible to B-series facts 
seems to indicate this (see Helm’s objection and Wolterstorff’s reply, respectively, in GAnssle, 
G. e. (ed.), God and Time..., pp. 214-218, 229-231).
309 Cfr. MArkosiAn, n., «Time», in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 26, 2005, <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/time/> [Last consulted: November 15, 2011].
310 Markosian notes that A theorists have two options: deny the relativity theory or deny that it 
actually entails the non-existence of absolute simultaneity. While the first option is unpopular 
among A theorists, the second one is promising. But it faces the task of providing just what the 
relativity theory entails with respect to absolute simultaneity. (cfr. MArkosiAn, n., «Time», 
p. 15). 
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much as it aims at getting a deeper understanding of what the biblical presen-
tation of God as having a history implies. He says,
we will emerge with a deeper understanding of how much of the biblical 
presentation of God has to be given up if one holds that God is timeless. 
The discussion will be a specimen of the Anselmian project of faith seeking 
understanding: the believer seeking to understand something of the «why» 
of what already he or she believes 311.
Thus, given his own understanding of the nature of time and his com-
mitment to what he believes to be the biblical orthodoxy, Wolterstorff argues for 
God’s everlastingness on two grounds: divine action and divine omniscience 312.
3.3.2. Divine omniscience and Temporality
•  if God’s action is historical, then, God is temporal
in the preceding discussion, it is clear why events are obviously tempo-
ral. But in the case of non-events like substances, properties, numbers and 
the like, Wolterstorff proposes «that we take whether or not something has 
a history as the determinant of whether or not it is in time» 313. Since human 
persons and animals have a history, they are temporal. Numbers are timeless 
because they do not have history. Does God have a history?
Wolterstorff’s affirmative answer is grounded on the theistic assumption 
that God acts in history and that the biblical narrative is a proof to that. He 
argues that God performs actions at different moments of time –in creation, 
in providence, and for the renewal of humankind– and the succession in the-
311 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 164.
312 Edward R. Wierenga notes that God’s everlastingness recently «has reached the status of a 
new orthodoxy among philosophers of religion». But considering that these two arguments in 
favor of divine temporality are mere objections to timelessness, he deems them as unpersuasive. 
For his discussion, see WierenGA, e. r. «Timelessness out of Mind», in GAnssle, G. e. and 
WoodruFF, d. M. (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, oxford University Press, 
New York, 2002, pp. 153-164.
313 WolterstorFF, n., «Unqualified Divine Temporality», p. 172. But Padgett notes that this 
definition lacks precision as «Time and history are not identical... not everything that is tempo-
ral has a history» (PAdGett, A. G., «Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff», in GAnssle, G. e. 
(ed.), God and Time..., p. 220). Padgett offers Nelson Pike’s more precise definition: «something 
is timeless if it is not located at any time and has no extension in time» (Pike, n., God and Time-
lessness, Routledge, London, 1970, p. 7). 
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se actions, i.e. their presence and absence on God’s time-strand, constitutes 
changes in God 314. Basically, he assumes that no timeless God can cause tem-
poral changes, for «the temporality of the event that God acts on infects God’s 
own action with temporality» 315.
Moreover, Wolterstorff holds that if God interacts with free human ac-
tions, then, He must be in time. «Some of God’s actions must be understood 
as a response to the free actions of human beings... i think it follows, given 
that all human actions are temporal, that those actions of God which are ‘res-
ponse’ actions are temporal as well» 316. But what compels that God’s actions in 
time must also be temporal? i agree with Helm in noting that «an eternal God 
could eternally decree a response to what He knows will happen at a given 
time» 317. Wolterstorff refuses to call this eternalist view as divine responsive-
ness for, he says, it is not «located in the actual fabric of history» 318.
Besides, if God were eternal or timeless, then, «God could not be the ob-
ject of any human action whatsoever» 319. Suppose that God is the object of a 
human act, e.g., my referring to God. This event is identical with another event 
of God’s being referred to by me, and is an aspect both of God and of me. Now, if 
God lasts longer than does my act of referring to God, then, there is succession in 
God’s time-strand, since for a while God is being referred to by me, and when i 
am gone, my referring to God ceases 320. Hence, God is temporal and to say that 
He is timeless would be contradictory.
if God were eternal... one could not know that God was eternal, or even 
believe that God was... one could not predicate of God that God is eternal. 
314 Cfr. WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 145. For Wolterstorff, «X is eternal if and only 
if X has no aspect that is a member of the temporal array». Temporal array is «a set of events (or 
a union of time-strands) such that each member stands to every member in one of the temporal-
order relations (precedence, succession, simultaneity), and such that no member stands to any 
event which is not a member in any of these relations». A time-strand is a «set of a given entity’s 
aspects such that each member bears a temporal-order relation to every member of the set...» 
(WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 137). 
315 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 150.
316 Ibid., p. 150.
317 HelM, P., «Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff», p. 216.
318 WolterstorFF, n., «Response to Critics», p. 233.
319 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 153.
320 However, it can be argued that God’s being referred to by me is accidental to God. How can an 
accidental property inflict an essential change (succession) in the subject? My constant thinking 
of being able to fly does not convert me in Superman. 
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For predicating is also a temporal act... if one predicates of God that God is 
eternal, then God is not 321.
All of these arguments rest on the basic assumption that it is self-contra-
dictory to affirm that a timeless God can bring about temporal actions. Howe-
ver, this apparent contradiction will disappear if we consider that fundamental 
to theism is the claim «that God and the world are ontologically distinct. 
God’s creative act never merges with the entities it creates» 322. Hence, tem-
poral actions do not necessarily entail a temporal agent as temporal effects do 
not require a temporal cause. Another argument that Wolterstorff advances 
appeals to divine omniscience.
•  if God knows what day is today, then, God is historical
Given Wolterstorff’s commitment to the A theory of time, it seems that 
God’s omniscience becomes incompatible with timelessness. He holds that if 
God is truly omniscient, then, He must know not only B-series but also A-
series facts 323. Now, since A-series facts change because what is present will 
be past and was future, what God knows also changes, because tomorrow He 
will know that «Today is Friday» and that «Yesterday was Thursday» 324. God 
must know something different at different times. His knowledge, then, is 
tensed and historical, and perforce, God is temporal. Conversely, if God has 
no history, then, He lacks tensed knowledge and cannot be omniscient for He 
does not know what day is today. Consequently, God could neither intervene 
nor respond to what transpires in the world since to do so, He needs tensed 
knowledge. Thus, «if God were eternal, God’s action would have to be enti-
rely non-interventionist» 325.
What Wolterstorff’s objection amounts to is simply that mental acts and 
states are temporally conditioned. But unless it is inherently contradictory 
321 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 153.
322 oWen, H. P., Concepts of Deity, p. 22.
323 For instance, God must know not only that the Twin Towers collapsed before the death of Blessed 
Pope John Paul ii but He must also know today that «it is Thursday».
324 «Since those facts come and go, God’s knowledge of them comes and goes... For one can know 
that something is presently happening only when it is; the knowledge that some event is occur-
ring can occur only when that event itself is occurring. The endurance of the knowledge exactly 
tracks the endurance of the event» (WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 175).
325 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 175.
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to say that «Knowing can be atemporal», why should we assume that all acts 
of knowing is temporal? 326 Thus, one quick eternalist reply to this objection 
would be to affirm that God’s knowledge is atemporal; hence, to say that He 
knows something different at different times is senseless. Ganssle expres-
ses a similar point saying «it is not true, it will be insisted, that God knows 
something today. He knows things about today but he knows these things 
timelessly» 327. However, this is exactly what the temporalist denies: that God 
is eternal and that He knows eternally. So we must face the objection squarely 
from the temporalist viewpoint.
Some eternalists affirm that indexical sentences express the same propo-
sitional content as non-indexical ones, so that by replacing the former with 
the latter, we can see that God’s knowledge does not need to change. After 
all, indexical terms like «yesterday», «today», «tomorrow», and «now» sim-
ply refer to different temporal locations used in different contexts and the 
meaning of the sentences that contain them also depends upon the context of 
its use 328. Thus, «i am writing now» may be replaced with «i am writing on 
November 17, 2011 at 12:30 P.M.» without expressing two different thoughts. 
God knows the timeless truth expressed in the latter sentence regardless of 
the time it is uttered. However, temporalists –Wolterstorff in particular– deny 
that temporal propositions («event e occurs at t1») are identical with indexical 
propositions («event e occurs now»). A-series facts are irreducible to B-series 
facts. Hence, God may know all non-indexical temporal propositions but He 
remains ignorant –if He is eternal– of what is happening now. To know it, God 
must be in time.
A possible response to Wolterstorff’s claim that divine omniscience re-
quires temporality is to hold that God is not propositionally but factually om-
niscient 329. God knows every fact (that i am writing now) but His access to it 
is not propositional (not through the sentence «i am writing now»), for this 
is accessible only by indexically located minds. We know facts through our 
326 owen rightly notes that to say «A mental act can be non-temporal» is contradictory only «if we 
knew a non-temporal mode of being, and if we knew that it cannot be compatible with a mental 
mode; but we do not possess either form of knowledge» (oWEN, H. P., Concepts of Deity, pp. 
20-21). 
327 GAnssle, G., «God and Time», in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, April 30, 2007, <http://
www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/> [Last consulted: November 16, 2011].
328 GAnssle, G., «God and Time», <http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/>.
329 Cfr. WierenGA, e. r. «Timelessness out of Mind», pp. 153-156. 
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temporal and spatial locations and we express them through indexical pro-
positions. Although God also knows these facts, spatio-temporal indexicals 
impede Him to access them through propositions because He is outside time 
and space. However, i agree with Ganssle that this answer is problematic since 
it compromises God’s omniscience.
one promising reply involves the denial of God’s knowledge as propo-
sitional. William Alston argues that God knows what He knows without ha-
ving any beliefs. His knowledge constitutes a direct awareness of facts invol-
ved 330. if this is true, then, we safeguard God’s omniscience while avoiding 
Wolterstorff’s objection because God needs not know tensed propositions of 
facts in order to know and to intervene in the temporal world. As Ganssle 
observes, «if God’s knowledge of a fact consists in the presence of that fact to 
God’s consciousness, it may be that this presence does not affect God intrin-
sically. if this is the case, God can be aware of different facts in their different 
temporal locations without himself changing» 331. Hence, God can be eternal. 
However, a more defensible theory for divine eternity requires accounting for 
the relation between temporality and timelessness.
3.3.3. Time and Eternity
Wolterstorff’s objections against the doctrine on divine eternity could be 
reduced into the question on the relationship between time and eternity. How 
can an eternal being intervene in time? How can a timeless cause bring about 
temporal effects? The charge of incoherence against the doctrine rests solely 
on the assumption that between timelessness and temporality, no relationship 
is conceivable. To assume otherwise would be absurd as it would entail a re-
lation of simultaneity between time and eternity. if God is eternal, then past, 
present and future exist all at once in God. on this view, Anthony Kenny says, 
«my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity... the great 
fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while i 
type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on» 332. i hold that a coherent 
account for the relation between time and eternity is tenable and defensible.
330 Cfr. Alston, W. P., «Does God Have Beliefs?» in Divine Nature and Human Language, Cornell 
University Press, ithaca, 1989, pp. 178-193. 
331 GAnssle, G., «God and Time», <http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/>.
332 kenny, A., The God of the Philosophers, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1979, pp. 38-39.
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To explain such relation, Aquinas claims that while effects may be tem-
poral their cause may not always be. Adopting Boethius’ definition 333, Aquinas 
emphasizes that nothing is wrong with saying that «God’s action existed from 
all eternity, whereas its effect was not present from eternity, but existed at 
that time when, from all eternity, He ordained it» 334. A logical implication of 
this view, says Wolterstorff, is that God cannot respond to our human affairs 
because «Responsiveness would require tensed knowledge on God’s part» 335. 
However, i think Wolterstorff’s premise is valid only if the A theory of time 
is true since it restricts the notion of responsiveness to this theory. Hence, 
unless we establish the truthfulness of tense theory, to conclude that an eternal 
God cannot respond to temporal human affairs is unacceptable and Aquinas’ 
solution remains intact.
The Kenny-type absurdity, as well as Wolterstorff’s difficulty in ac-
counting for the relation between God’s timeless knowledge and the tem-
poral nature of its objects would only come into view if we want to capture 
such relation in strictly temporal terms, as both thinkers do. Kenny finds it 
absurd that, in God’s knowledge, Rome is still burning while i am writing 
this thesis. Wolterstorff could not imagine how God could respond to our 
prayers if He is timeless since, naturally, if it is truly a response, then, it must 
follow after our prayer is made. And God must know what we are praying 
now in order to respond to it. But what Kenny is contemplating is temporal 
simultaneity. What Wolterstorff is thinking is temporal succession. Besides, 
the claim that tensed knowledge is necessary to bring about God’s response 
remains debatable 336.
333 «Eternity is the whole, simultaneous, perfect possession of limitless life, which we can better un-
derstand perhaps by comparing it to temporal things» (BoetHius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 
v, slAvitt, d. r. (trans.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 168).
334 ScG, ii, 35. (Emphasis is mine.) i take «that time» to refer to the specific moment in time when 
the effect of God’s action takes place.
335 WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 175. He says, «none of God’s actions is a response 
to what we human beings do... nothing at all in God’s life is a response to what occurs among 
God’s creatures» (WolterstorFF, n., «God Everlasting», p. 174). 
336 Moreover, there’s the unresolved question on whether or not God’s knowledge is tensed. it can 
also be argued that, as my mother knows that i would always ask for chocolate cake every time 
i come home and prepares it, analogically, God also can dispose from all eternity whatever we 
need so that His response in time to our needs does not necessarily depend upon His knowing 
that we need them now. in this picture of God’s response, the bringing about of the response is 
eternal and does not need any tensed knowledge. But the effects are in time and have to attend 
to the present need. 
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With Ganssle, i agree that the relation between time and eternity «can-
not be captured by using strictly temporal relations such as simultaneity be-
cause temporal simultaneity is a transitive relation» 337. What we need, then, is 
a non-transitive notion that will allow us to see temporal changes as effects of 
eternal causality. if we can find such a notion –which i think, is highly tenable– 
then, Wolterstorff’s basic assumption that no eternal being can bring about 
temporal effects will be rendered inoperative in his argumentation. However, 
i submit that such non-transitive notion can hardly be found in the A-series 
view of time. For on this view, events are objectively past, present and future, 
regardless of their relation to any minds. Thus, at the outset, any non-transi-
tive relation is already shut off. Helm could be right in observing that since, 
in the B-series view, events are tenselessly related to each other, it could help 
us find a non-transitive notion of relation «by enabling us to think of the tem-
poral series from a standpoint that is indifferent to any point within it. From 
this it is a short step to thinking of God as occupying a standpoint outside that 
series, a timeless standpoint that entails a tenseless relation between all events 
but which is not entailed by it» 338.
With the aim of finding such a non-transitive concept of relation, 
Stump and Kretzmann introduce the notion of «ET (eternal-temporal)-
simultaneity» 339, which may exist between what is eternal and what is tempo-
ral or, to be more exact, between an eternal reference and a temporal referen-
ce. in this view, both authors argue that for someone who occupies an eternal 
reference frame, two temporal events at different temporal positions can both 
be present (eternally), being ET-simultaneous, while not being simultaneous 
with each other for someone occupying a temporal reference frame. «For 
every x and for every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous, if and only if (i) either x 
is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and (ii) for some observer, A, in the 
unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both present-i.e., either x is eter-
nally present and y is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and (iii) 
for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, 
337 GAnssle, G., «God and Time», <http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/>.
338 HelM, P., «Eternity», in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 4, 2010, <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/eternity/>, [Last consulted: November 16, 2011], p. 9.
339 Cfr. stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity», in The Journal of Philosophy, 78/8 (August, 
1981), pp. 429-458. Ganssle comments that most of the contemporary discussion on timeless-
ness begins with this article.
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x and y are both present-i.e., either x is observed as eternally present and y is 
temporally present, or vice versa» 340.
The theory may seem promising but contemporary philosophers point 
out its alleged inherent difficulties. Delmas Lewis, insisting on the temporal-
eternal divide, attempts to prove as incoherent the ET-simultaneity on the 
ground that «temporal observers and their observations occur in time, and thus 
any eternal x must exist at the same time that any temporal y observes x» 341. Wi-
lliam Hasker also raises similar objection 342. But Stump and Kretzmann notes 
that Delmas and Hasker’s objections depend on the general principle that no 
event can be epistemically or metaphysically present to any being unless both 
share the same mode of existence – a claim which, Stump and Kretzmann say, 
is incompatible with the ET-simultaneity. on this principle, to be metaphysi-
cally present to an eternal being, a thing must be eternal itself. To be directly 
aware of a temporal event requires being temporal oneself. But i think the 
principle begs the question for it presupposes a metaphysical and epistemolo-
gical irreconcilable divide between time and eternity, exactly the problem in 
question. Stump and Kretzmann has successfully shown that this principle is 
false because it cannot be applied to space. if God, who is non-spatial can be 
directly aware of spatial beings, without sharing their spatial mode of existence, 
why can’t He do so without sharing their temporal mode of existence? 343 But 
to avoid this type of objection, they modify the ET-simultaneity definition by 
adding that temporal events are situated with respect to observers occupying 
an eternal and temporal reference frames in such a way that these observers 
«can enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of them and (if 
capable of awareness) can be directly aware of each of them» 344.
The ET-simultaneity theory also faces serious opposition with regards 
to its concept of atemporal duration 345. Helm notes its mere ad hoc character 
340 stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity», p. 439. 
341 leWis, d., «Eternity Again: A Reply to Stump & Kretzmann», in International Journal for Phi-
losophy of Religion, 15 (1984), p. 75. 
342 «if... the world really is temporal, only a temporal God can be immediately aware of it – and 
then only of its present, not of its past or future» (HAsker, W., God, Time and Knowledge, Cornell 
University Press, ithaca and London, 1989, p. 169). 
343 Cfr. stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity, Awareness, and Action», in Faith and Philosophy, 
9 (1992), p. 476.
344 stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity, Awareness, and Action», pp. 477-478.
345 Herbert J. Nelson argues that the notion of an infinitely extended atemporal duration is flawed 
(cfr. nelson, H. J., «Time(s), Eternity, and Duration», in International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, 22 [1987], pp. 3-19).
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and deems it unnecessary, as it only tries to do justice to Boethius’ definition 
of eternity 346. Paul Fitzgerald argues for the serious incoherence between ti-
melessness and duration. Anything that counts as extension must meet three 
formal features: (1) «two distinct particulars can both have the kind of exten-
sion in question», (2) «two particulars may both have the same or a different 
amount of the mode of extension in question»; and (3) «by having different 
positions along the extensive dimension in question two qualitatively identical 
particulars can be numerically distinct» 347. if God has timeless duration, then, 
two or more of divine thoughts will have either the same or different amounts 
of duration or are numerically distinct. But this entails succession; hence, tem-
porality. And unless this eternal duration has analogues with temporal dura-
tion, it would not qualify as bona fide duration. But if it qualifies as duration, 
on what ground it is timeless?
i think Stump and Kretzmann’s reply is quite decisive 348. They rightly 
note that the eternity doctrine is incoherent only if we assume that all exten-
sions must be divisible; hence, successive. But «in assuming that the denial of 
succession is a denial of an extended mode of existence Fitzgerald begs the 
question» 349. Besides, given that all temporal and spatial extensions are po-
tentially or conceptually divisible, as is generally undisputed, «nothing in that 
fact... provides good grounds for inferring that what is atemporally extended 
must also be divisible» 350.
346 Helm holds that Kenny’s objection will stand only if we think of eternity as a timeless duration. 
«But there is no compelling reason to think that timeless eternity is a kind of time, or that it has 
aspects of duration... To say that everything is present to God is not to suppose that everything 
is temporally present to God, that God has an experience of everything happening at once» 
(HelM, P., «Eternity», p. 11). Besides, whether Boethius really holds a timeless duration in God 
or is it just a matter of posterior interpretation is still debatable today. 
347 Cfr. FitzGerAld, P., «Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity», in The Journal of Philoso-
phy, 82 (1985), pp. 262-263. 
348 Cfr. stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Atemporal Duration: A Reply to Fitzgerald», in The 
Journal of Philosophy, 84 (1987), pp. 214-219.
349 stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity, Awareness, and Action», p. 466. Stump and 
Kretzmann extend to Fitzgerald Thomas Reid’s decisive criticism of John Locke, who derives 
the idea of duration from the idea of succession. Reid says, «We may measure duration by the 
succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet; but the notion or 
idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is anteced-
ent to its being measured» (reid, t., Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay iii, Ch. v, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 328). 
350 stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity, Awareness, and Action», p. 466. Stump and 
Kretzmann notes that some philosophers and physicists argue for extended but indivisible atoms 
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in defending timeless duration in God, Brian Leftow tries to avoid 
Friztgerald’s objection by introducing what he calls a Quasi-Temporal Eternali-
ty (QTE) 351. He holds that distinct moments exist in the life of an eternal God. 
These moments, though eternally sequential and successive, are not parts but 
points, since God has them all at once in one eternal now. Leftow’s timeless 
duration shares features with temporal duration but without rendering God 
temporal. This is possible by distinguishing between typically temporal proper-
ties (TTPs) and properties that make something temporal (PMTs). Such distinc-
tion allows Leftow to suppose that God, though possessing some TTPs, can-
not be temporal because it is not the mere possession of TTPs which makes 
a being temporal, but having the right TTPs. Besides, Leftow argues, most 
eternalists hold that God has TTPs and, similarly, no temporalist thinks that 
God has every TTPs 352. Timeless duration and being present, then, can be cases 
of TTP that God has but do not make Him temporal. So keen and promising 
is Leftow’s analysis that, in Ganssle’s words, it demonstrates how some objec-
tions to timeless duration and God’s relation to a temporal world are not really 
decisive. «A timeless God can be present, though not temporally present, to 
the world. He can have a life which is an event having duration, though not 
temporal duration» 353.
However, the notion of a timeless duration does not seem to convince 
Katherine Rogers who challenges the claim that timelessness in Boethius and 
other medieval thinkers includes duration 354. Stump and Kretzmann repre-
sents time and eternity as two parallel lines in which the timeless line repre-
sents one indivisible present while the temporal line has points, each of which 
of space or time. Cfr. sorABJi, r., Time, Creation and the Continuum, Duckworth, London, 1983 
and kretzMAnn, n., «Continua, indivisibles, and Change in Wyclif’s Logic of Scripture», in 
kenny, A. (ed.), Wyclif in His Times, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1986, pp. 31-65. 
351 «The life of a being with QTE is an extension in which positions are ordered as earlier or later. 
Yet none of it ‘passes away’ or is ‘yet to come’» (leFtoW, B., Time and Eternity, Cornell Univer-
sity Press, ithaca and London, 1991, p. 120). See also leFtoW, B., «The Eternal Present», in 
GAnssle, G. e. and WoodruFF, d. M. (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, oxford 
University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 21-48. in this article, Leftow tries to show coherently 
that, on Boethius’ view, though God’s life is eternal, «there are events in it, and these events have 
what is typically a temporal property: they occur in a present» (p. 21).
352 For instance, being wholly future to some temporal event is a property that God cannot possess 
though He is temporal because He has no beginning.
353 GAnssle, G., «God and Time», <http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/>.
354 Stump and Kretzmann take their cue from Boethius’ definition of eternity which, according to 
both, includes the concept of duration. Leftow defends such claim.
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is present one at a time 355. in this picture, it seems that God’s eternal life is 
stretched out alongside the temporal line. However, this geometrical analogy, 
says Rogers, is unfamiliar to medieval thinkers. For them, time and eternity 
is like a circle and a point at its center. Timelessness (the center dot) stands in 
the same relation to each point along the temporal array (the circle). The cen-
ter point itself has no extension; hence, no duration 356. As to Leftow’s QTE, 
Rogers points out the dilemma it entails: either Leftow must argue for the 
distinction between there being sequential moments in God and God experiences 
them all at once or he must grant that earlier and later moments can be simulta-
neous in God’s life. Rogers denies timeless duration but this does not imply a 
kind static existence. She likens God’s relation to the world to human memory 
of the past. Just as we can recall a whole series of sequential past events in one 
present mental exercise, God, in his timeless now, can know non-sequentially 
the whole sequence of temporal events. But this does not require extension 
and duration in His eternal life.
However, Rogers’ non-sequential divine knowledge of sequentially or-
dered temporal events seems to be as problematic as the atemporal duration 
for, again, it brings us back to the problem of time-eternity relation. i sub-
mit that Stump and Kretzmann have captured essentially Aquinas’ notion of 
eternity that includes the element of timeless duration. in Summa Theologiae, 
Aquinas holds as an unchallenged premise that «eternity signifies a kind of 
duration» 357. At the same time, emphasizes that, being simultaneously whole, 
«eternity has no succession» 358. As Stump and Kretzmann have shown, on 
Aquinas’ account, a relation between time and eternity is clearly defensible 
and tenable.
As a summary, it becomes clear that the bulk of Wolterstorff’s contention 
on divine temporality rests mainly on his commitment to what he believes to 
355 Cfr. stuMP, e. and kretzMAnn, n., «Atemporal Duration», p. 219.
356 Fitzgerald also notes that «This ‘nondurational’ or ‘point’ interpretation fits the ‘totum simul’ 
formula insofar as that is construed simply as denying extensive magnitude» (FitzGerAld, P., 
«Stump and Kretzmann...», p. 264).
357 S. Th. ia, q. 10, a. 1, obj. 2 & 6. Stump and Kretzmann argue, contra Herbert Nelson, that 
Aquinas’ position has undergone a development. «it seems reasonable to infer that any wor-
ries Aquinas may have had at an early stage of his career about attributing duration to eter-
nity he had abandoned some fourteen years later, when he wrote S. Th. ia» (stuMP, e. and 
kretzMAnn, n., «Eternity, Awareness, and Action», p. 479, note no. 5).
358 S. Th. ia, q. 10, a. 1, respondeo.
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be Scriptural orthodoxy, coupled with his adherence to the A-theory of time. 
But both grounds can be contested – and are, in fact, being contested; hence, 
they cannot be considered decisive in favor of his position.
4. AnAlysis And critique
As we have seen, the main objection against the doctrine of divine sim-
plicity is two-fold: on its intrinsic coherence and on its systematic consistency 
with other theistic doctrines. As to the first, Wolterstorff limits himself in 
saying that it is merely a question of intuition. The question on coherence 
is just a matter of explaining the difference between two ontological styles 
– constituent and relational. Acceptance or rejection of the doctrine merely 
depends on what approach one is inclined to embrace. He rather dedica-
tes much attention to the systematic objections thinking, perhaps, that in 
showing its inconsistencies, the intrinsic incoherence will just naturally show 
up and the doctrine will just die a natural death. if this analysis is correct, i 
deem Wolterstorff’s move unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly Wolterstorff’s merit to have shed more 
light on the contemporary bafflement over the simplicity doctrine. His 
constituent-relational ontology distinction, despite possible and reasonable 
objections against it, has clarified various fundamental points of disagree-
ment between classical and analytic philosophy. With respect to the former, 
Wolterstorff’s critique allows for a more lucid understanding of the classical 
doctrine and shows its necessity in the contemporary milieu. With regards 
to the latter, it provides a clearer view of the contemporary analytic position, 
which is necessary for a continued dialogue.
However, Wolterstorff’s worth should not dazzle us exceedingly so as 
to overlook the danger of thinking that the question on divine simplicity is 
just a «conflict of intuition». The fundamental question is: Which ontolo-
gical approach can provide us with a more comprehensive view of reality? 
While relational approach assures us that reality is intelligible, constituent 
approach guarantees that what we know is the objective reality. The exer-
cise of right reason requires the recognition of both dimensions, most es-
pecially in its inquiry about a simple God. only in this right exercise can 
reason –that natural light strengthened by faith– be «raised above itself in 
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contemplation insofar as it knows God to be everything that it naturally com-
pre hends» 359.
So far, Wolterstorff has not engaged in a fully developed critique against 
the intrinsic coherence of the simplicity doctrine, i guess, partly because he 
thinks Plantinga and others already had done it more than sufficiently that to 
offer his own critique may simply be redundant. However, as we have seen 
above, the doctrine’s intrinsic incoherence is far from being demonstrated for, 
as Weigel wisely observes, the objections to its intrinsic character are basica-
lly characterized by either some presumptions favoring certain modern inter-
pretations (or misinterpretations), or some neglect of its pillar concepts. on 
analytic interpretations, the simplicity doctrine is misunderstood as giving a 
positive description of God. Given its analytic relational approach, as Wol-
terstorff himself admits, such interpretation could never yield a positive diag-
nosis on the doctrine’s internal coherence. Neither of its internal incoherence, 
i may add.
But Wolterstorff has not given a compelling motive why we should em-
brace the analytic reading of the doctrine. But we must insist that in its ori-
ginal conception, the simplicity doctrine is fundamentally apophatic 360, for 
as Aquinas teaches repeatedly, we cannot know what God is, but only what 
He is not. This apophatic character should indicate the inadequacy of the 
relational ontological approach alone in inquiring about God. For, as we have 
seen, such approach intrinsically tends to be constructive, that is, describing 
positively what God is 361.
Nevertheless, the doctrine’s apophatic character should not lead us to 
conclude that nothing can be known about God. We know that God exists by 
His effects although we do not really know what He is in His Essence. Wol-
terstorff rightly observes that, on the relational approach, the theistic identity 
359 tHoMAs AquinAs, On Boethius’ on the Trinity, q. 1, a. 2, in tHoMAs AquinAs, Selected Writings, 
Mcinerny, r. (ed. & trans.), Penguin Classics, London, 1998, p. 117.
360 «‘Simplicity’ is negative in its signification or meaning» (WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., 
p. 28).
361 By «constructive», i mean that the relational approach tends to compose two separately subsist-
ing entities through some kind of relations. intrinsically, it poses a problem when it is applied 
in inquiring about God: that God stands in relation with (exemplifies) divinity, omnipotence 
or other intrinsic abstract properties, compromises the notion of God as an Absolutely Perfect 
Being for it entails that God is by virtue of His relation with another entity. Anselm argues that 
God cannot be what He is «through another» (cfr. AnselM, Monologion, i-iv). 
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claims are problematic. But it does not necessarily follow that the problem 
pertains to the intrinsic nature of the claims rather than to the inherent cha-
racter of the approach. if, on this approach, analytic thinkers can hardly cap-
ture what Weigel considers as the central notion of Aquinas’ version of the 
doctrine: God as Pure Act, which makes it possible to conceive of God as 
Subsistent Existence 362, why ascribe the problem to the doctrine rather than 
to the approach?
i submit that the principal problem is inherent in analytic philosophy to 
which Wolterstorff is inscribed. As Moros points out, its root could be traced 
back to Frege’s distinction between names and predicates, or the logical and 
ontological abyss between what is singular and what is universal that this dis-
tinction entails. on this metaphysical chasm depends the relational character 
of analytic ontology 363. Crossing such abyss without committing a «category 
mistake» is impossible.
But this problem manifests nothing but the Achilles’ heel of analytic phi-
losophy especially in its point of departure. its overemphasis on the analysis 
of language or predication carries with it the unfortunate neglect of being qua 
being, and, consequently, the fateful disregard of the very important distinc-
tion that Aquinas emphasizes between ontological (real) and logical (predi-
cative) being with all its consequences. Such negligence, i hold, is what lies 
behind the bafflement that contemporary analytic thinkers encounter with the 
simplicity doctrine. To resolve such perplexity, it is not enough to appeal to 
the intrinsic distinction between these two ontological styles.
Rather, what we need is to understand Wolterstorff’s neat distinction 
between constituent and relational ontologies in the light of the classic dis-
tinction between real and veridical being. on Aquinas’ account, that which is 
constitutive of reality (being as such or real being) is distinguished but not 
362 Cfr. WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., Chapter iii, pp. 103-136. After presenting Aquinas’ 
arguments for God’s Pure Actuality, Weigel shows that Pure Actuality is infinite Plenitude. God 
as Subsistent Existence is discussed in the following chapter (pp. 137-160).
363 «Me parece que en este punto se afronta el problema principal para la comprensión de la doc-
trina de la simplicidad en la filosofía analítica. En efecto, el problema tiene sus raíces en la 
distinción fregeana entre nombre y predicados; mejor incluso, en el abismo lógico y ontológico 
que entre singulares y universales establece esta distinción. De ella, a su vez, depende el carácter 
relacional de la metafísica analítica, según el cual los predicados son poseídos por un sujeto, pero 
no lo constituyen, ni lo puede constituir: un ser concreto no puede estar constituido de seres 
abstractos» (Moros, e., El argumento ontológico modal de Alvin Plantinga, p. 143).
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separated from its predicative conceptualization (being in proposition or veri-
dical being) 364. The act of being (existence) constitutes all that there is in rea-
lity (constituent approach). Yet, we conceive reality by predicating qualities of 
any subject; thus, representing reality as something composed of subject and 
predicate (relational approach). Weigel notes: «Divine simplicity implies the 
added complication that all things predicated of God are identical with the 
whole of God. Whatever the subject and predicate terms signify will be iden-
tical. in the case of ‘God exists’ the subject and the predicate terms both ul-
timately signify the whole of God. God is affirmed to be identical with God’s 
actus essendi. Here the subject term does not ultimately signify a form nor 
supposit for a substance, since according to Aquinas, God has no substantial or 
accidental forms to delimit Him and only composite beings are substances» 365.
on the relational approach, it is easy to see how the subject participates in 
the predicate. Thus, Wolterstorff would say that God and creatures participate 
in abstract and subsistent perfections, like Goodness. However, accurate rea-
soning will tell us that the propositional or veridical being is distinct –though 
not separated from– ontological or real being 366. ontologically speaking, to 
say that God stands in relation with His abstract properties is to introduce 
ourselves into the dilemma of explaining the ontological status of these abs-
tract objects and their relation to the infinite Being. This may entail fatal 
consequences on the doctrine on God’s Supreme Perfection and Sovereignty. 
With this line of thought, we run the risk of creating God in our own image 
and likeness.
Needless to say that Aquinas’ real-veridical distinction of being is a con-
ditio sine qua non for a more profound understanding of the divine simplicity 
doctrine as it sheds light over the contemporary confusion over the doctri-
ne. Moreover, the resolution of such bafflement should proceed from a prior 
364 Cfr. tHoMAs AquinAs, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum ii, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1. For a brief but sub-
stantial, easy to read discussion of ‘Being’ and its uses, see WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., 
pp. 68-77.
365 WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., p. 72. 
366 Anthony Meredith points out how Gregory of Nyssa already emphasizes that «in God there is 
no question of participation in goodness» and that «only where there is no participation of the 
subject in the predicate can there be true simplicity» (MereditH, A., «The Divine Simplicity: 
Contra Eunomium i. 223-241», in MAteo-seco, l. F. and BAstero, J. l. (eds.), El «Contra Eu-
nomium I» en la Producción Literaria de Gregorio de Nisa: VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de 
Nisa, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1988, p. 345). 
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examination of the inadequacy of relational approach, complementing such 
insufficiency with constituent ontology, to the recuperation of the classical 
notion of God as Pure Actuality and Subsistent Existence, with the aim of 
establishing firmly the doctrine’s inherent coherence 367. once intrinsic cohe-
rence is demonstrated, objections on the doctrine’s systematic incoherence 
with other theistic claims will simply appear as a problem of interpretation. if 
the divine simplicity doctrine is intrinsically and rationally coherent, then, it 
cannot –when properly understood– defy revelation and faith since «both the 
light of reason and the light of faith come from God... hence there can be no 
contradiction between them» 368. Thus, divine simplicity, contra Wolterstorff, 
can neither be incoherent with the Sacred Scripture nor with the exercise of 
right reason.
5. conclusions
As a matter of conclusion, we may affirm the following. First, Wolters-
torff, in seeking a better understanding of his faith, inquires about the doctri-
ne on divine simplicity but found it difficult to sustain owing to his relational 
ontological perspective. A brief survey of the contemporary debate on the 
question only shows that our author’s and other analytic thinkers’ rejection of 
the doctrine is quite premature and unwarranted, for they failed to prove its 
intrinsic and systematic incoherence.
Second, Wolterstorff’s distinction between constituent and relation on-
tology is, indeed, enlightening as it explains the contemporary bafflement 
over the simplicity doctrine. However, an engagement with our author’s dis-
cussions on divine immutability, eternity and omniscience demonstrates that 
the problem lies not in the simplicity doctrine itself but in the relation onto-
logical approach to reality.
in view of this, i have argued for the centrality of the doctrine of sim-
plicity in Western theism. But inquiring about a simple God requires that we 
367 it is important to note how, for Aquinas, to be supreme actuality and existence is «tantamount to 
being supremely perfect and good. in this way, the two pillars of the doctrine of simplicity, God 
as Pure Act and Subsistent Existence, form the bedrock of the account of the divine perfection 
and goodness» (WeiGel, P., Aquinas on Simplicity..., p. 40).
368 FR, no. 43; cfr. also ScG, i, 7.
Russell Alivio BAntiles
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recuperate Aquinas’ notions of Pure Act and Subsistent Existence. Besides, i 
suggest that Aquinas’ distinction between real and veridical being fill up the 
deficiency of relational ontology. only in this way can we see the intrinsic co-
herence of the simplicity doctrine and its systematic consistency with Chris-
tian faith and revelation. indeed, inquiring about a simple God illustrates how 
faith and reason can interact harmoniously like two wings that elevate the 
human spirit to the contemplation of truth.
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